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Freedom of speech is critically important.  As a fundamental human right, 
free speech has been enshrined in many constitutions and international conven-
tions, such as the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the United 
Nations Human Rights Bill, the Human Rights Convention of the European 
Countries, and even the constitution of China.  But it seems that not all the coun-
tries in the world have truly upheld this fundamental human right—China includ-
ed. 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Tsinghua University School of Law; Ph.D., Intellectual Property Law, 
The Post Graduate School of China Academy of Social Science; LL.M., Comparative Law, Southern 
Methodist University Dedman School of Law; LL.M., Civil and Commercial Law, Tsinghua University 
School of Law; B.S., Engineering Mechanics, Tsinghua University. 
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The restrictions on the freedom of speech in China are obvious.  For a long 
time, freedom of speech and several other fundamental individual rights in Chi-
na’s constitution have been considered mere aspirations because the constitution 
has not yet been fully implemented or enforced.  It is apparent that, when com-
pared with the extent of freedom of speech in the United States, China has many 
restrictions on the content of speech in both traditional media as well as online.  If 
we were to place countries on a spectrum illustrating the range of free speech—
with the leftmost point having extreme censorship and the rightmost point having 
no censorship—the former Soviet Union (USSR), Iran, North Korea, and pre-
modern China—before the reform and open policy in 1979—would be on the far 
left.  On the opposite end would be the United States.1  Modern China would 
probably fall in the middle of the spectrum—or perhaps a bit left of middle—
showing the unique characteristics of China’s media regulation policy. 
Why does China’s media policy have such unique characteristics?  What led 
to the situation today and what will China’s media policy become in the future?  
More broadly, what can be anticipated for the whole political structure?  We need 
to answer these questions with a general overview of the developing process of 
China’s historic institutions, culture, and geopolitics rather than just focusing on 
the policy of media itself.  As Douglass North stated: 
 
History matters.  It matters not just because we can learn from 
the past, but because the present and the future are connected to 
the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions.  Today’s 
and tomorrow’s choices are shaped by the past.  And the past 
can only be made intelligible as a story of institutional evolu-
tion.2 
 
This article discusses the route of institutional transformation, justifications, 
and historical precedents for China’s media policy and regulations. 
In conclusion, human civilization can be categorized into two types: power-
regulated societies and rights-regulated societies.  Each type of society has its 
own institutional features and exhibits a different policy of media regulation; be-
cause China is in the process of transitioning from a power-regulated society to a 
rights-regulated society, its current policies of media regulation exhibit the over-
lap of the dynamic characteristics of both types of societies. 
 
1 See FRED S. SIEBERT ET AL., FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS: THE AUTHORITARIAN, LIBERTARIAN, 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOVIET COMMUNIST CONCEPTS OF WHAT THE PRESS SHOULD BE AND DO 67 
(1956).  As Fred Siebert stated, 
The United States and Great Britain have been the chief custodians of libertarian principles for more 
than a century, but other countries of the world have to a greater or lesser extent adopted these same princi-
ples.  As the democratic form of government spread throughout the world, the concept of freedom of 
speech and press followed as an integral part of the libertarian doctrine. 
Id. 
2 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE vii 
(James Alt ed., 1990). 
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This article consists of five sections.  First, the foundation of this article is 
based on the essences of institutions, their functions in society, and the factors 
that have compelled institutional transformation.  The second section compares 
the qualities of a power-regulated society versus a rights-regulated society.  These 
two contrasting societies are based on different methods of force used by gov-
ernments to control social order, power, and private rights.  The third section 
compares and analyzes the different requirements and functions of media in the 
two contrasting societies.  This comparison will explain why China and the US 
have different attitudes and policies toward speech.  The fourth section explains 
the current policies of media regulations in China, including the characteristics 
stemming from the interaction of both types of societies.  Also, it is important to 
examine the progress of modern China’s institutional transformation from a pow-
er-regulated society to a rights-regulated society.  The conclusion, drawing from 
this research, proves that China’s media regulations are dynamic—continuously 
adjusting according to the institutional transformation—and contain overlapping 
and interacting characteristics of both types of societies. 
 
 




In this article, four concepts form cornerstones for the entire discussion.  
They are: the power-regulated society, the rights-regulated society, the media 
power-controlled model, and the free media model. 
A power-regulated society refers to a society in which the social order is en-
forced or regulated by one or several powers.  Because members of society com-
pete for scarce resources, which may cause social disorder, the regime of power, 
as the enforcer, controls social members’ competition to maintain order.  They 
control the scarce resources and distribute them in an organized manner.  The 
regimes of power can be religions, tribes, governments or even underground soci-
eties.  Obviously, states are the typical regimes of power.  The USSR, some Arab 
countries, and other totalitarian states in history are generally structured as power-
regulated societies.  Pre-modern China is a typical example of one of the most 
powerful power-regulated societies. 
A rights-regulated society refers to a society in which the social order is root-
ed in the private rights of its individuals.  The scarce resources, such as lands and 
products of labor, are organized by the members of society through private rights 
such as ownership.  The predominant way of acquiring the scarce resources is by 
trading in the market.  The regime of power in a rights-regulated society aims to 
protect the private rights and maintain fairness in the market.  It is also prohibited 
from interfering with the allocation of scarce resources under the title of private 
rights unless legally authorized.  England was the first country in the world to 
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transform into a rights-regulated society in the seventeenth century. Today, nearly 
all of the developed and democratic countries in the world are rights-regulated 
societies.  The United States is a typical example of one of the most powerful 
rights-regulated societies in the modern world. 
The media power-controlled model refers to a society in which the media and 
expression are controlled or strictly regulated by the regime of power.  The meth-
od of control or regulation may not be universal.  It can take place through the 
regime’s ownership and direct control over the media entities or through its li-
cense or grant of permission to a third party.  Or a regime could retroactively pun-
ish a disobedient media entity or individual.  A regime could also use a combina-
tion of the methods.  In a power-regulated society, the policy regulating media is 
generally the media power-controlled model with direct or indirect censorship. 
The free media model refers to a society in which media entities are inde-
pendent and free from control or supervision of the state or any other regime of 
power.  The regime of power cannot freely control or regulate the content of me-
dia of its own free will.  Furthermore, the investment in or operation of media 
entities is independent from the regime of power.  In a rights-regulated society, 
media regulation generally follows the free media model.  It may only be restrict-
ed for the purpose of direct or indirect protection of private rights through a legit-
imate process authorized by law.  Therefore, the key characteristic of the free me-
dia model is that it is free from a suppressive regime of power rather than from 
the protection for private rights. 
In their book, Four Theories of the Press,3 coauthors Fred Siebert, Theodore 
Peterson and Wilbur Schramm categorized four major approaches to communica-
tion: the authoritarian theory, the Soviet Communist theory, the libertarian theory, 
and the social responsibility theory.  The first two theories are related to the me-
dia power-controlled model, whereas the last two theories are related to the free 
media model.  As the scholars said, 
 
Since the beginning of mass communication, in the Renaissance, 
there have been only two or four basic theories of the press—
two or four, that is, according to how one counts them. . . . The 
Soviet Communist theory is only a development of the much 
older Authoritarian theory, and what we have called the Social 
Responsibility theory is only a modification of the Libertarian 
theory.4 
 
Therefore, when we discuss the two media regulation models in this article, 
the characteristics described in the Four Theories of the Press can be taken as 
references accordingly. 
 
3 SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 1. 
4 Id., at 2. 
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In this article, besides the above four basic concepts, “network new media” 
refers to media based on digital technology and computer science, such as the 
internet.  This differs from traditional media—which is based on tangible inter-
mediaries—and broadcastings via analog technology.  Network new media can be 
characterized as communication from end users to end users through borderless 
digital networks. 
 
B. Competition and Institutions 
 
1. Competition and Technology 
 
Foremost, the relationships between competition, technology, and institutions 
must be thoroughly explored.  They are essential to understanding the potential 
driving forces and reasons that China has experienced institutional transformation 
and macroscopic societal evolution in the past two centuries. 
According to Darwinism, all lives have two natural instincts:  to survive and 
to reproduce.5  British scholar Richard Dawkins further claimed that because all 
living creatures, including humans, need to survive and procreate, they are inher-
ently selfish.6  Therefore, when resources are scarce, the competition among or-
ganisms is unavoidable.  According to Darwin’s theory of evolution, all species 
need to adapt to competition in order to survive.7  Competition has always result-
ed in the survival of the fittest.8  The process of evolution creates billions of dif-
ferent species, and we are just one of many evolutionary creations.  A distinguish-
ing characteristic of humans is our ability to create complex tools; these tools are 
technology.  For survival in Earth’s competitive environment, humanity’s success 
has depended on our intellect and technology.9 
 
5 See 1 CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 76 (new ed. rev. enl. 1864).  Charles Darwin 
argued, 
All that we can do, is to keep steadily in mind that each organic being is striving to increase at a geo-
metrical ratio; that each at some period of its life, during some season of the year, during each generation or 
at intervals, has to struggle for life, and to suffer great destruction. 
Id. 
6 See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 87 (30th Anniversary ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2006).  
Richard Dawkins stated, 
The vast majority of significant interactions between genes in the evolutionarily stable set—the gene 
pool—go on within individual bodies. These interactions are difficult to see, for they take place within 
cells, notably the cells of developing embryos. Well-integrated bodies exist because they are the product of 
an evolutionarily stable set of selfish genes. 
Id. 
7 See DARWIN, supra note 5, at 76. 
8 See DAWKINS, supra note 6, at 66–67.  Richard Dawkins explained: 
Survival machines of different species influence each other in a variety of ways.  They may be preda-
tors or prey, parasites or hosts, competitors for some scarce resource. . . . For reasons that we shall see, it is 
usually the males who compete with each other for females.  This means that a male might benefit his own 
genes if he does something detrimental to another male with whom he is competing. 
Id. 
9 JEREMY RIFKIN, THE THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: HOW LATERAL POWER IS TRANSFORMING 
ENERGY, THE ECONOMY, AND THE WORLD 187–88 (2011) (“The Social Darwinist’s view of nature as a 
battleground, where every creature is fighting with each other to grab as much of the Earth’s resources as 
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It is technology that helps humans succeed in the natural environment.  Tech-
nology also threatens the lives of humans and other species, as well as the harmo-
nization of natural environment.10  Perhaps because of these factors brought by 
the development of technology, the regime in a power-regulated society is gener-
ally hostile to the skills and progress of technology, as seen in ancient China.11  
Regardless, technology has always had significance in the history of human civi-
lization.  The ability to use technology has often been the deciding factor in com-
petition between different groups of humans.  Competition and technology are the 
key distinctions between senior civilizations and junior civilizations.  The devel-
opment of society is ultimately driven by the progress of technology.  As 
Douglass North said, “The industrial revolution was not the source of modern 
economic growth.  It was the outcome of raising the private rate of return on de-
veloping new techniques and applying them to the production process.”12  There-
fore, competition has been driving the continuous development of technology for 
humans, and in turn the development of technology has been accelerating the in-
tensity of competition between humans.  This has caused some peril for society.  
Humans have been participating in this cycle for millions of years, and it is accel-
erating.  Competition, technology, and institutions are the three fundamental fac-
tors for a society’s progression. 
 
2. Competitions and Institutions  
 
The ability to construct institutions is another striking difference by which 
humans can be distinguished from other species.  Humans mainly use institutions 
because of their power to help regulate competitive behavior. 
By using technology to direct competition, humans have achieved tremen-
dous advantages in evolution.  But technology also greatly accelerates the intensi-
ty of other competitions among humans, resulting in such behaviors as robbery, 
kidnapping, killing, rape, and genocide from technological weapons.  The in-
tense—and even crucial—competition among humans causes great risk to the 
 
possible for itself and its progeny, has been taken up by nations and acted out on the grand stage of history 
in the form of geopolitics. . . . The new view unfolding in science, by contrast, sees the evolution of life and 
the evolution of the planet’s geochemistry as a co-creative process in which each adapts to the other, assur-
ing the continuation of life within the Earth’s biosphere envelope.”).  
10 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER: FROM PRE-HUMAN TIMES TO THE 
FRENCH REVOLUTION 32 (2011) (“[T]he primary difference is that human beings are more deadly because 
they are able to use a wider and more lethal suite of weapons.”). 
11 See DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY SOME ARE SO RICH AND 
SOME SO POOR 57 (1999).  As David Landes described Ancient China: 
The ingenuity and inventiveness of the Chinese, which have given so much to mankind—silk, tea, 
porcelain, paper, printing, and more—would no doubt have enriched China further and probably brought it 
to the threshold of modern industry, had it not been for this stifling state control.  It is the State that kills 
technological progress in China. 
Id. (quoting ETIENNE BALAZS, LA BUREAUCRATIE CELESTE: RECHERCHES SUR L'ÉCONOMIE ET LA 
SOCIÉTÉ DE LA CHINE TRADITIONNELLE 22–23 (1988)). 
12 DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW 
ECONOMIC HISTORY 157 (1973). 
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lives and reproduction of members of society.  The consequence of an uncivilized 
world or state of nature is a state of uncertainty.13 
Humanity gradually developed norms to constrain some of the disruptive 
competitive behaviors among social members and save them from the dangerous 
state of nature.  These norms became more complicated and comprehensive, ne-
cessitating the eventual formation of institutions.  As Douglass North states, “In-
stitutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction.  In consequence they structure 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic.”14  Nearly 
all the institutions, regardless of their level of formality, are meant to restrict 
competition for scarce resources.15  Sex is one of the scarcest resources, so the 
harsh competition for sex needs fine-tuned institutions to regulate it.  In advanced 
societies, norms or prohibitions related to sex are often complicated, sensitive, 
and redundant.16  As scholar Francis Fukuyama describes, “Male reproductive 
strategy maximizes success by seeking out as many sexual partners as possible, 
while the female reproductive strategy involves harboring the resources of the 
fittest male for her offspring.”17  Sunshine and air are also indispensable for the 
survival of humanity, but we could hardly find any rules, regulations, or norms 
about them in any civilization.  The reason is obvious—they are not scarce.  
Therefore, no competition occurs to gather them, and no institutions are necessary 
to regulate them. 
Complicated technologies and institutions are the two fundamental character-
istics that distinguish humans from other species.  All civilizations are composed 
of elements derived from these two basic essentials.  Different attitudes to-
wards—and abilities in using—technology and constructing institutions are re-
markable cultural traits of nations.  The inherent selfishness of life and the scarci-
ty of resources cause competition for those resources.  The competition stimulates 
development of technologies, the development of technologies accelerates the 
intensity of competitions, and the intensity of competitions requires the con-
straints of social behaviors.  It is these constraints that drive the creation and in-
novation of institutions.  American scholar Charles Tilly summarized, “War 
drives state formation and transformation.”18  
State governments are the most prominent political institutions that regulate 
competition within their territories and, sometimes, in an international setting.  
The creation of a state shapes the society by using legitimate force to suppress 
illegitimate violence, but it also accelerates the intensity of competition between 
states.  The formation of states accelerates such competition via the intentional 
 
13 “The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not 
necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction.”  See NORTH, supra note 2, at 6. 
14 Id. at 3. 
15 See id. at 1–3. 
16 See FUKUYAMA, supra note 10, at 36. 
17 Id.  
18 CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 990-1990, at 20 (1990). 
2017   Weiguang: The Rationale of China’s Media Regulation Policy 71 
and systematic organization of human resources and intelligence.  Therefore, 
some popular free market economists blame the creation of states as the source of 
all evils.19  Arguably, it is the competition between states that tends to be irration-
al and destructive, because, so far, no ultra-state has had enough power to resist 
irrational competition.  The massive globalization since the nineteenth century 
has forced China into direct competition with the Western world.  Such global 
competition has driven the institutional transformation of China from a power-
regulated society to a rights-regulated society. 
Hence, competition, technology, and institutions are the three dominant vari-
ables used to analyze the formation and evolution of a society.  For China, the 
harsh competition lasting for about five hundred years during the Spring and Au-
tumn period and Warring States period—from 770 to 221 B.C.—drove the nation 
to advance technological ethics and then to form superior political institutions. 
The successful political institutions have maintained China’s competitive ad-
vantage for more than two thousand years, which, rather non-intuitively, weak-
ened the impetus for further development of technology and institutions.20  Harsh 
competition with the Western countries since the mid-nineteenth century has 
forced China into the process of developing technology and forming a competi-
tive institution once more.21  Since institutional transformation is a process of 
organizing social members into a new form, media is a critical component of the 
process.  As Charles Horton Cooley points out, “History may be regarded as a 
record of the struggle of man to realize his aspirations through organization; and 
the new communication is an efficient tool for this purpose.”22  Only by looking 
at all of China’s history, can we perhaps understand China’s current political 









19 See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, POWER & MARKET: GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY 279 (Ludwig 
von Mises Institute 4th ed. 2006) (1970) (“It is precisely statism that is bringing back the rule of the jun-
gle—bringing back conflict, disharmony, caste struggle, conquest and the war of all against all, and general 
poverty. . . . The free market, therefore, transmutes the jungle’s destructive competition for meagre subsist-
ence into a peaceful co-operative competition in the service of one’s self and others.”). 
20 See LANDES, supra note 11, at 55–57.  David Landes recounted: 
The one civilization that might have surpassed the European achievement was China.  At least that is 
what the record seems to show.  Witness the long list of Chinese inventions: the wheelbarrow, the stirrup, 
the rigid horse collar (to prevent choking), the compass, paper, printing, gunpowder, porcelain. . . . The 
mystery lies in China’s failure to realize its potential.  One generally assumes that knowledge and know-
how are cumulative; surely a superior technique, once known, will replace older methods.  But Chinese 
industrial history offers examples of technological oblivion and regression. 
Id. 
21 See infra Part II.A. 
22 CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 90 (1909). 
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II. POWER-REGULATED SOCIETIES VERSUS RIGHTS-REGULATED SOCIETIES 
 
 
Humans gradually formed institutions to regulate the competition between 
individuals and organizations.23  These institutions can be generally categorized, 
depending on their methods of force to regulate behavior, as either power-
regulated societies or rights-regulated societies.  In these two types of societies, 
the enforcement of regulations comes from different sources.  As described by 
scholars, it is similar to the differentiation of a top-down society versus a bottom-
up society.24  China is in the process of transforming from a power-regulated so-
ciety to a rights-regulated society and currently has features from both models.  
The characteristics of the two types of societies are compared in detail below with 
the goal of helping us understand China’s current phenomena. 
 
A. The Characteristics of Power-Regulated Societies 
 
Before the first rights-regulated state formed in England, most societies in the 
world were a form of power-regulated society or quasi power-regulated society. 
China, before the reform and open policy of 1979, and the USSR were prime ex-
amples of power-regulated societies.  Ancient China was one of the most success-
ful power-regulated country in the world—embodying nearly all the typical char-
acteristics of this model. 
First, a totalitarian regime is the most typical and successful political model 
in a power-regulated society.  The order of society is structured upon power ra-
ther than private rights.  If more than two sources of power overlap in a society, 
the risk of conflict and war between the powers would escalate to the extent that 
irrational competition among the powers could cause disorder in the society.  We 
have many records throughout history supporting this hypothesis.  One example 
is pre-modern Europe.  Because several powers rooted in different secular states 
and several religious authorities overlapped in Europe for most of its history, 
there were many frequent and cruel conflicts, including the two devastating world 
wars in the twentieth century.25  Alfred North Whithead pointed to the Refor-
 
23 See NORTH, supra note 2, at 6 (suggesting that institutions were necessarily caused to address the 
uncertainty caused by competition). 
24 Some scholars, such as G. William Skinner, portray a country’s society by two sets of central-place 
hierarchies.  The first one was constructed largely from the bottom-up—emerging from exchange—and the 
second one was imposed mainly from the top-down—resulting from imperial control.  See TILLY, supra 
note 18, at 127.  The latter’s nested units comprised a hierarchy of administrative jurisdictions.  Id.  The 
top-down system uses spatial logic of coercion, whereas the bottom-up system uses spatial logic of capital.  
Id. 
25 See id. at 128.  Charles Tilly stated, 
In a pamphlet published in 1637, Jesuit Giuldo Aldeni reported that his Chinese friends asked Europe:  
“If there are so many kings, how can you avoid wars?”  He replied naively or disingenuously, ‘The kings of 
Europe are all connected by marriage, and therefore live on good terms with one another.  If there is a war, 
the Pope intervenes; he sends out envoys to warn the belligerents to stop fighting.  This in the middle of the 
frightful Thirty Years’ War, which eventually drew the vast majority of European states into the blood-
letting. 
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mation as an example of “a popular uprising, [which] for a century and a half 
drenched Europe in blood.”26  Similarly in China, the Spring and Autumn period 
and the Warring States period lasted for more than five hundred years after the 
collapse of the Zhou Dynasty—the sole legitimate authority of political power in 
the territory at the time.  The wars and conflicts among many states independent 
from Zhou’s regime brought chaos and harm to society.27  Only the Qin Dynasty 
dispelled all other regimes of power and unified all the states into one.28  This 
unification was the start of the totalitarian period of China, which lasted for more 
than two thousand years, until the Xinhai revolution led by Sun Yat-sen in 1911.29  
The two thousand years of totalitarianism contributed to China’s culture.  Litera-
ture and a measurement system were unified and disseminated.30  China became a 
major cultural hub that was preserved in the inner society and defended from for-
eign competition.31  Compared to Europe, war was much less frequent throughout 
these two thousand years.32  American scholar Kenneth Lieberthal highly com-
mends the political achievements of China in history:  
 
The traditional Chinese state was an awesome political achieve-
ment, the most advanced such governing body in the world.  
Featuring a centralized bureaucratic apparatus begun over two 
thousand years ago by Qin Shi Huangdi (r. 221–210 b.c.), the 
first emperor of the Qin dynasty (221–206 b.c.), China’s system 
of governance evolved through the rise and fall of various dyn-
asties until the early 1900s.33 
 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
26 ALFRED NORTH WHITHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 2 (1925). 
27 See WOLFRAM EBERHARD, A HISTORY OF CHINA 51 (E.W. Dickes trans., 3d ed. 1969).  Wolfram 
Eberhard described: 
The period following that of the Chou [Zhou] dictatorships is known as that of the Contending States 
[, from 480 to 222 B.C.].  Out of over a thousand states, fourteen remained, of which, in the period that 
now followed, one after another disappeared, until only one remained.  This period is the fullest, or one of 
the fullest, of strife in all Chinese history. 
Id. 
28 See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 5 (2d ed. 
2004).  
29 See id. (describing China’s centralized system of government which began approximately two thou-
sand years ago and lasted until the early 1900s). 
30 See id. 
31 See infra Part IV.A. 
32 See BERTAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEM OF CHINA 12 (1922).  As Bertrand Russell observed, 
The Great War showed that something is wrong. . . . The Chinese have discovered, and have practiced 
for many centuries, a way of life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the world 
happy.  We Europeans have not.  Our way of life demands strife, exploitation, restless change, discontent 
and destruction. 
Id. 
33 LIEBERTHAL, supra note 28, at 5. 
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Since 1949, communist China has successfully resumed the power-regulated 
model of governance, adopting the USSR’s political paradigm.34 
Second, power-regulated societies are generally morally disciplined—so 
called “morality competition” or “glory competition” societies.  The criteria for 
morality may stem from religion, the political regime, or even culture.  Competi-
tion for morality or glory has two key functions in power-regulated societies.  
One key function is the regime of power’s counteraction to inherent selfishness of 
individuals by introducing morals benefiting the regime.  Therefore, filial piety, 
patriotic devotion, collectivism, and nationalism were established as the core 
moral criteria of Chinese society and other East Asian nations historically influ-
enced by China.  In other regions of the world, like Europe, religious beliefs have 
nearly the same function of counteracting individual selfishness.  The second key 
function of morality competition in power-regulated societies is the constraint on 
the regime’s power.  Since legitimate power serves as society’s main method of 
regulating the potential negative competition between members in a power-
regulated society, no other forces are available to constrain the legitimate force 
itself.  As British scholar Lord Acton said, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely.”35  The politicians of ancient China also clearly knew 
that power needed to be constrained and, therefore, had strict rules and penalties 
for bureaucratic officers.36  Furthermore, power was valued and constrained by a 
set of moral principles.37  For instance, the posthumous name system of giving 
honorary names to royalty after their passing served as an evaluation of an em-
peror’s life achievements and performance.38  This system caused emperors to be 
morally conscientious of their actions.  As Derk Bodde remarked:   
 
[The Chinese] are not a people for whom religious ideas and ac-
tivities constitute an all-important and absorbing part of life. . . . 
It is ethics (especially Confucian ethics), and not religion (at 
least not religion of a formal, organized type), that provided the 
spiritual basis in Chinese civilization.39 
 
Third, China has long been a society with a strong foundation in family eth-
ics, which has had an impact on China’s culture that continues to this day.  If we 
analyze the structure of China’s society, we see that all of China’s society can be 
 
34 See generally, Satya J. Gabriel, The Structure of a Post-Revolutionary Economic Transformation: 
The Chinese Economy from the 1949 Revolution to the Great Leap Forward (Sept. 1998), 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/courses/sgabriel/economics/china-essays/3.html. 
35 Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (April 5, 1887), in HISTORICAL ESSAYS AND 
STUDIES (John Neville Figgis & Reginald Vere Laurence eds., Macmillian & Co. 1907). 
36 See generally, THE EDS. OF ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, Chinese Civil Service, ENCYCLOPÆDIA 
BRITANNICA (Apr. 7, 2008), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-civil-service. 
37 See FUNG YU-LAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 3–4 (Derk Bodde ed., 1948). 
38 See, Ulrich Theobald, Terms in Chinese HistoryNames of Persons and Titles of Rulers, CHI-
NAKNOWLEDGE.DE (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Terms/titles.html. 
39 FUNG, supra note 37 (quoting Derk Bodde, Dominant Ideas in the Formation of Chinese Culture, 
62 J. OF AM. ORIENTAL SOC’Y (1946)). 
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viewed as a pyramid, with the emperor at the summit and servants on the lowest 
tier.  Each layer of the pyramid consists of family-based groups in competition 
with each other, which cultivated China’s unique ethical culture.  Before the Brit-
ish industrial revolution, Ancient Chinese economics were predominantly a fami-
ly-based agricultural model.40  According to Ronald Coase’s transaction cost the-
ory, the main function of enterprises is to reduce the cost of transactions in the 
market.41  Family based on blood relations was the most economic and efficient 
business organization in the agricultural society before the emergence of collec-
tive agriculture based on modern techniques.42  Therefore, family became the 
basic operating and competing unit in China; all family members contributed to 
their family.43  As a community, members each lived according to their different 
roles in which their happiness, lives, values, and security were enclosed.44  The 
success or failure of an individual in the society was closely connected with the 
whole family’s fate.45  The derivative of family based ethics today is relationship 
culture, called Guan Xi.  As Fung Yu-lan described:  
 
The family system was the social system of China.  Out of the 
five traditional social relationships, which are those between 
sovereign and subject, father and son, elder and younger brother, 
husband and wife, and friend and friend, three are family rela-
tionships.  The remaining two, though not family relationships, 
can be conceived of in terms of the family.46 
 
Guan Xi serves as a structure for society’s social network, by which the 
members can benefit from the competitions.  Any such relationship, including 
classmates, military mates, and colleagues, can be called Guan Xi.  The credit 
system of China’s society is mainly based on such Guan Xi networks.47 
Fourth, social members’ competitive behaviors are aimed at obtaining power, 
because power is typically proportionate to control over scarce resources.  Power 
in power-regulated societies is attached to social status.  Therefore, power-
 
40 Id. at 21. 
41 See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937).  In the article, 
Prof. Coase argued that, although production could be carried out in a completely decentralized way by 
means of contracts between individuals, the fact that it costs something to enter into these transactions 
means that firms will emerge to organize what would otherwise be market transactions whenever their costs 
were less than the costs of carrying out the transactions through the market.  Id. 
42 See FUNG, supra note 37, at 21–22. 
43 See id. at 21. 
44 See id. at 21–22. 
45 See RUSSELL, supra note 32, at 60.  Bertrand Russell explained: 
It is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these trouble upon themselves, by their inability to 
produce capable and honest officials.  This inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lays upon a 
man’s duty to his family rather than to the public.  An official is expected to keep all his relations supplied 
with funds, and therefore can only be honest at the expense of filial piety. 
Id. 
46 FUNG, supra note 37, at 21.  
47 See RUSSELL, supra note 32, at 60. 
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regulated societies are centered on status.  The rules of competition are decided 
by the regime of power that controls the scarce resources.  For instance, in ancient 
China, the regime of power was generally in favor of literate knowledge and 
skills, such as poems, paintings, calligraphies and history, rather than those relat-
ed to technology and natural sciences.48  Thus nearly all the intellectuals put their 
energy and minds to the study of these literatures, which had the effect of stifling 
the development of technology and natural sciences.49  This policy can explain 
the lack of many Chinese scientific and technological contributions in the last 
three hundred years.  Even though China invented paper, the printing press, gun-
powder, and the compass—three of which were claimed to change the world by 
renowned scholar and scientist Francis Bacon50—later dynasties placed little or 
no emphasis on further developing these technologies.  China has had a stagger-
ing number of technological innovations, such as harnessing the power of rushing 
water in streams and rivers—twelve hundred years before Europeans—creating 
the world’s first suspension bridge, inventing stirrups, creating the seismograph, 
and inventing hang gliding and parachuting.51  The advantages of ancient Chinese 
technology, however, were continuously reduced because of policy aimed at sti-
fling competition.  This reduction lasted until the Self-Strengthening Movement 
(1861–1894) at the end of the Qing Dynasty.52 
In summation, for more than two thousand years until 1979, China was a typ-
ical power-regulated society.  Today, the culture, political system, and order of 
Chinese society still embody strong characteristics of such a society.  For most of 
the time since the unification of the Qin Dynasty, power-regulated China created 
a strong and stable nation in the open land of eastern Asia, cultivated a unique 
and continuous Chinese culture, and kept society in order.  If the fundamental 
purpose of an institution is to keep humanity organized by regulating their com-
petitive behaviors, China’s power-regulated society was successful before global-
ization placed China in direct competition with the Western world.  As Tao 
Xisheng, a well-known Chinese historian, commented, “The [Chinese] totalitarian 
system made the country rich, maintained the military strong and ruled the people 
 
48 Id. at 48–49. 
49 It is said that the natural sciences and technology was discouraged by the power of regimes in Chi-
na’s history because natural sciences and technology would increase the competition and difficulties of 
keeping the society in order.  A similar attitude for new technology can also be found in the Christian 
world.  For instance, the crossbow was initially prohibited by the pope when it was first introduced into 
Europe by ancient China due to its destructive capability.  See generally H. J. SCHROEDER, DISCIPLINARY 
DECREES OF THE GENERAL COUNCILS: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 195–213 (1937) (Canon 
29 of the Tenth Ecumenical Council of 1139 forbids the “God-detested art of stingers and archers” against 
Christians and Catholics). 
50 “We should note the force, effect, and consequences of inventions which are nowhere more con-
spicuous than in those three which were unknown to the ancients, namely, printing, gunpowder, and the 
compass.  For these three have changed the appearance and state of the whole world. . . .”  ELIZABETH L. 
EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE 43 (1979) (quoting FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM 
ORGANUM, at Aphorism 129 (1620)). 
51 See DAVID CURTIS WRIGHT, THE HISTORY OF CHINA 64–66 (2nd ed., Greenwood Press 2001). 
52 See Jason Qu, Self-Strengthening Movement of Late Qing China: an Intermediate Reform Doomed 
to Failure, 8 Asian Culture and Hist., no. 2, 2016, at 150. 
2017   Weiguang: The Rationale of China’s Media Regulation Policy 77 
easily.”53  Compared with the characteristics of rights-regulated societies, illus-
trated below, a power-regulated society maintained very different mores.54  Liang 
Shuming pointed out, “For China, the past success is just the failure today; the 
past advantages of hers are just the shortcomings today.”55  The remarkable and 
inertial culture of China’s historic power-regulated society has hindered the insti-
tutional transformation of China today, which needs a strong driving force that 
will drive the transition gradually and safely.  
 
B. The Characteristics of Rights-Regulated Societies 
 
The United States is undoubtedly the most powerful and typical rights-
regulated society in the world today.  Using the United States as an example, the 
main characteristics of a rights-regulated society are discussed below and com-
pared to those of a power-regulated society. 
First, in a rights-regulated society the scarce resources are labeled and held 
by the members of the society as private rights.  The order of society relies on the 
private rights through which the members of the society compete for scarce re-
sources.  The legitimate method of competition is trading.  This is different from 
power-regulated societies, in that the wealth of a rights-regulated society can be 
measured by the dollar amount and frequency of its members’ trades.  Historical-
ly, England was the first nation to successfully transform into a rights-regulated 
society.56  Today, the United States is the most typical and successful rights-
regulated society.  The power to enforce social order is rooted in the people’s 
power to elect government representatives, who serve as the regime of power. 
Second, in a rights-regulated society, the regime of power serves to protect 
the interests of private rights and the market of trading.  Therefore, a healthy 
rights-regulated society needs a government with integrity that does not interfere 
with private rights, except to protect them, as its fundamental purpose.  To ensure 
honesty in the government, the most popular political structure in a rights-
regulated society is democracy and the rule of law.  In a healthy rights-regulated 
society, competition for scarce resources is shaped by private rights, which pro-
vide protection from robbery, murder, fraud, rape, and other harms.  The regime 
of power and private rights coexist as two layers; rule of law and the democratic 
 
53 TAO XISHENG (陶希圣), ZHONGGUO ZHENGZHI SIXIANG SHI（中国政治思想史）[THE HISTORY 
OF POLITICAL THOUGHTS IN CHINA] 225–227 （Encyclopedia Publishing House of China 2009). 
54 See infra Part III.B. 
55 LIANG SHUMING (梁漱溟), XIANGCUN JIANSHE LILUN（乡村建设理论）[Theory of Coun-
tryside Construction], in LIANG SHUMING COLLECTIONS 196 （Shandong People’s Publishing House (山
东人民出版社) 2005). 
56 See NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 12, at 156.  Douglas North discussed the transformation: 
England, after an inauspicious start, by 1700 was experiencing sustained economic growth.  It had 
developed an efficient set of property rights embedded in the common law.  Besides the removal of hin-
drances to the allocation of resources both in the factor and product markets, England had begun to protect 
private property in knowledge with its patent law.  The stage was now set for the industrial revolution. 
Id. 
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process are the only formal connections between the two layers from the institu-
tional point of view.  Hence, the competition between political parties in a rights-
regulated society, such as the partisan model in the United States, differs entirely 
from the competition for control in a power-regulated society.  Competing behav-
iors in rights-regulated societies are controlled by legal frameworks that are 
grounded in private rights.  
Third, rights-regulated societies use social ethical systems as the foundation 
of society, rather than individual morality or glory-seeking.  In a rights-regulated 
society, members of the society compete for resources by trading instead of using 
glory or moral superiority to merit awards from the regime of power.  In Europe-
an history, this different ethos developed as a result of Martin Luther’s religious 
reformation that challenged people to face God directly rather than relying on the 
hierarchical Catholic Church.57  Thus morality became a personal issue instead of 
a social measurement judged solely by the Catholic Church.58  Therefore, in 
rights-regulated societies, any restrictions on the freedom of behavior unsupport-
ed by private rights are called into question.59 These restrictions are gradually 
reduced despite having long been supported from a moral point of view, including 
those on homosexual marriage, euthanasia, and pornography.  
Rights-regulated societies need social ethics far more than power-regulated 
societies because the holders of private rights need to trade with each other to 
exchange resources.  Therefore, social ethics and behavioral norms develop from 
socially cooperative societies.  Such mores include teamwork, responsibility, 
credibility, respect for queuing, and honesty in trading—all of which are favored 
in rights-regulated societies such as the United States.  On the contrary, Chinese 
society has a system of etiquette based strongly on social status.60  Less coopera-
tive cultures, such as chaotic traffic and bad service from public institutions, can 
be found nearly everywhere even today.61 
Fourth, the culture of a rights-regulated society is a type of business culture 
characterized by equality, freedom, and cooperation—or put simply, an arm’s 
 
57 See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 40 (Talcott Parsons 
trans., Routledge 2001) (1930). 
58 See Id.  Max Weber argued: 
The conception of the calling thus brings out that central dogma of all Protestant denominations 
which the Catholic division of ethical precepts into precepta and consilia discards.  The only way of living 
acceptably to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but solely through the ful-
fillment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by his position in the world.  That was his calling. 
Id. 
59 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 62 (Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux 2009) (citing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)).  Michael Sandel claims 
that individuals have rights “so strong and far-reaching [that] they raise the question of what, if anything, 
the state may do.”  Id.  He concludes that “only a minimal state, limited to enforcing contracts and protect-
ing people against force, theft, and fraud, is justified. Any more extensive state violates persons’ rights not 
to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified.”  Id. 
60 See supra Part II.A. 
61 See generally, Min Ding & Jie Xu, The Chinese Way 16 (2015); Shanti Hitton, Social Culture in 
China, USA TODAY, http://traveltips.usatoday.com/social-culture-china-16258.html (last visited Feb. 15, 
2017). 
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length culture.  By enforcing social equality, members can choose to do business 
with freewill rather than being coerced by higher powers.  With this freedom, 
members can sell scarce resources to the most competitive trading partners.  By 
cooperating, members can decrease the transactional cost of trading and have a 
more profitable win-win result.  The remarkable differences between the two 
types of societies can be easily witnessed in real life—outside of academic study.  
China’s culture is that of a typical family-based, power-regulated society, so we 
can find that the members of the society only establish trust through relationships.  
They are generally indifferent to strangers and less cooperative without enforced 
order or supervision from some legitimate power.62  
Members in rights-regulated societies compete to increase trading capacity.  
This differs from a power-regulated society, in that entities in a rights-regulated 
market economy are directly competing to increase trading capacity with con-
sumers.  As discussed earlier, humans acquire competitive advantages via tech-
nology.63  The development of technology is the fundamental force by which hu-
mans meet competitive requirements.  Therefore, by competing in trade, the en-
terprises use their capital and human labor on research and development of new 
technologies, resulting in an increase of technological output.64  This competitive 
cycle for technological advancement was nonexistent in ancient China, which 
discouraged and even stifled the innovation of technology.65 
A society that encourages the development of technology is one that increas-
es its ability to compete with the world and seize resources from it.  This practice 
makes social members rich but has negative repercussions on other humans and 
the Earth.  By encouraging the development of technology, a rights-regulated so-
ciety acquires extraordinary advantages when competing with eastern Asian 
countries, such as pre-modern China, which was contemptuous of technology.  
This especially holds true in the nineteenth century, when the Chinese were using 
spears against the Westerners’ firearms.66 
In summation, rights-regulated societies regulate competition through private 
rights.  By competing for trade, the members of the society contribute their wis-
 
62 See RUSSELL, supra note 32, at 220–21.  Bertrand Russell recalled: 
Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writer pressed me to say what I considered the chief 
defects of the Chinese.  With some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice and callousness. 
Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry, admitted the justice of my criticism, and proceed-
ed to discuss possible remedies. 
Id. 
63 See supra Part II.B.2. 
64 See MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848 
/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm#007 (last visited Feb. 15, 2017) (“The bourgeoisie, during its rule of 
scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all 
preceding generations together.  Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry 
to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for 
cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had 
even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?”).  
65 See DENG YINKE, ANCIENT CHINESE INVENTIONS, 7 (2011). 
66 See generally SAROLTA TAKACS, THE MODERN WORLD: CIVILIZATIONS OF AFRICA, EUROPE, 
AMERICAS, MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIA, ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 725 (2015). 
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dom, energy, and capital to the development of technology; this process is direct-
ly or indirectly facilitated by institutions.  The entire culture, ethical system, and 
political structure of a rights-regulated society stems from a model of competition 
that is quite different from that of a power-regulated society.  The institutional 
transformation of China from a traditional power-regulated society to a modern 
rights-regulated society requires reform on all levels of society, from culture and 
politics to theories of competition and behavioral paradigms.  Furthermore, be-
cause Chinese traditional media and new network media have quite different 
backgrounds, they compete and interact with each other in a way that exposes the 
complexities of institutional transformation. 
  
 




Above, we have discussed and compared the two types of societies in human 
history.  The common purpose of these different societies is to maintain lawful 
order based on their own parameters.  All institutions need to create, maintain, 
and protect a form of competition.  Institutions must legitimize competition and 
prevent it from running astray.  Taking these as universal parameters, we will see 
that these different types of societies, though both moral and legitimate, have 
completely different media regulation policies and content. 
 
A. Media Policy in Power-Regulated Societies 
 
First, the purpose of media regulation in a power-regulated society is to pro-
tect the regime’s authority to enforce social order.  If the authority of power can-
not maintain order, then other potential competing secondary powers will likely 
emerge to compete for the power of the primary authority.  Therefore, the central 
policy of media regulation in a power-regulated society is to help the regime to 
counter any secondary powers that could potentially compete with the primary 
power.  Media thus becomes the instrument of the regime, used to rule the majori-
ty.  The earliest use of power to regulate speech occurred during the Warring 
States period, which unified China and created the Qin Dynasty.  The emperor of 
the Qin Dynasty accepted reformer Li Si’s advice to burn poems and books that 
proclaimed adversarial laws, thus becoming the first restriction on free speech.67  
Later, the prime minister of the Qin Dynasty, Han Fei, also claimed that to limit 
offenses, the best policy should restrict the thoughts of the people68; the mediocre 
policy was to restrict the expressions and the inferior policy was to directly re-
 
67 See Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Discourse for the 
Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience, 24 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 1, 20–21 (2010). 
68 See, Jason P. Blahuta, Fortune and the Dao 181 (2012). 
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strict the behaviors.  Since then, restrictions on thoughts and speech have been a 
main national policy in China for more than two thousand years.69 
Second, power-regulating regimes have the power to designate media accord-
ing to their own standards.  Content that complements the authority is permitted, 
and even encouraged, and the critical content is restricted and sometimes prohib-
ited.  The function of media in a power-regulated society is to unify the masses 
into a common consciousness that accepts and maintains the social order ap-
proved by the regime.  That is to say, “‘[c]orrect political orientation’ determines 
a publication’s life or death.”70  This characteristic of media regulation can be 
found in nearly all power-regulated societies, such as in Catholic society, pre-
modern China, France, and Japan.  This type of media policy still exists today in 
regions of the Middle East, North Korea, and China—especially before the re-
form and open policy.71  American political philosopher Hannah Arendt observed 
that truth and politics “are on rather bad terms with each other.”72  She stated that 
power threatened truth, particularly “factual truth,” because “facts and events—
the invariable outcome of men living and acting together—constitute the very text 
of the political realm.”73  Arendt’s observations are correct in that regimes of 
power select what truths to disseminate to the general public and competitors.  
The regime prefers to publicize facts that buttress its competitive strategy and 
hide facts that threaten or criticize its power.  The regime in power needs to con-
vince the masses that unfiltered truth is not an innate born principle or value soci-
ety must follow.  Therefore, the different attitudes towards truth of power-
regulated societies and rights-regulated societies stem from different policies and 
rules for competition.  In a power-regulated society, the authority of power may 
inhibit truth telling to enhance advantages in competition.  In a rights-regulated 
society, the enterprises or individual may hide the truth by so-called “right of pri-
vacy” or trade secrets for competitive advantage.  When the target of competition 
is changed, the regime of power will develop different attitudes towards truth.  
For instance, when states compete in matters of national security, they will favor 
secrecy and discretion, rather than open communication and truth.74 
Third, media entities are generally controlled by the regime of power in a 
power-regulated society—that is, the media power-controlled model.  In the tradi-
tional media market, publishers control the content transmitted from authors to 
consumers because of the scarcity of the media resources.  This means that pub-
 
69 See HE QINGLIAN, THE FOG OF CENSORSHIP: MEDIA CONTROL IN CHINA 31 (Paul Frank trans., 
2008).  “The ambiguity of propaganda discipline works greatly to the government’s advantage by making 
journalists fear accusation for anything they write.  The goal is to make news workers keen to understand 
what the higher authorities expect of them and to exercise greater ‘self-discipline.’”  Id. 
70 Id. at 16. 
71 See infra Part IV.A. 
72 HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 227 (1968). 
73 Id. at 231. 
74 See generally Philip Bump, U.S. Government Charges NSA Leaker Edward Snowden With Espio-
nage, NAT’L JOURNAL (June, 21, 2013), https://www.yahoo.com/news/u-government-charges-nsa-leaker-
edward-snowden-espionage-202141515.html?ref=gs. 
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lishers serve as the sole intermediaries for any author wanting to communicate 
their works to the public.  Therefore, without any exceptions, the publishing enti-
ties in China are all state-owned or state-controlled.75  For the same reason, the 
publishing industry is also strictly prohibited from foreign investment.76  By con-
trolling ownership rights, the government tries to control the content created or 
communicated by these entities.  As E.H. Carr said, “It is significant that the na-
tionalization of thought has proceeded everywhere pari passu with the nationali-
zation of industry.”77  
Fourth, the content of media in a power-regulated society has characteristics 
of competition rooted in society-specific morality and glory.  To conciliate the 
inherent selfishness of social members, power-regulated societies build up moral 
competitions for the members and reward the winners or the most obedient com-
petitors.  During the organization of such competitions, media is the most im-
portant tool.  Without media, such competition cannot be widely organized.  
Therefore, to maintain and protect social ethics—while preventing the decline of 
moral standards—one main function of the regime of power is to regulate and 
review the content of media by filtering offensive, vulgar, or pornographic infor-
mation.78  As David Curtis Wright points out, “[c]ensorship is mostly political but 
occasionally can assume a puritanical streak and be directed against the overtly 
sexual written word.”79 
As seen in the USSR or pre-modern China, media in a power-regulated socie-
ty is the regime’s propaganda tool.80 By using propaganda, the regime can selec-
tively broadcast censored content to the public that upholds the favorable moral 
competition.  Public debate and discussion are stifled in order to separate the 
masses into horizontal and isolated groups.  There was no such theory of free 
speech because of the threat that certain ideas could harm the authority of the re-
gime or bring chaos to society.  The regime collects information on society via 
 
75 See Hongsong Song, Dancing in Shakles: Copyright in China’s Highly Regulated Publishing Mar-
ket, 60 J. Copyright Soc’y 285, 287 (2013). 
76 Id. at 289. 
77 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 153 (1944) (emphasis omitted). 
78 See generally Full text of Hu’s report at 18th Party Congress, CHINA DAILY, 
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-11/18/content_15939542.htm.  Specifically, Hu’s report stated: 
We should promote the development and flourishing of cultural activities of ethnic minorities.  We 
should carry out public cultural activities and guide the people to express, educate, and serve themselves in 
the course of developing culture.  We should launch reading programs for the general public.  We should 
improve the contents of online services and advocate healthy themes on the Internet.  We should strengthen 
social management of the Internet and promote orderly network operation in accordance with laws and 
regulations.  We should crack down on pornography and illegal publications and resist vulgar trends. 
Id. 
79 WRIGHT, supra note 51, at 6.  David Curtis Wright recounted: 
In May 2000 the Chinese Communists banned the novel Shanghai Baby (Shanghai Baobei) because 
of its striking depictions of sexuality and drug abuse in Shanghai. The novel sold 80,000 copies before it 
was banned, but underground copies of it were widely available to anyone, including curious foreigners, 
who wanted to read what the government had proscribed and confiscated. 
Id. 
80 See generally Jack Linchuan Qiu, Virtual Censorship in China: Keeping the Gate between the Cy-
berspaces, 4 Int’l J. Comm. L. & Pol’y 1 (2000). 
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different channels, such as internal reporting lines.  The access by the public to 
true information is controlled and accessible only in varying amounts according 
to the respective positions in the pyramid of power.81 
To summarize, the characteristics of media policy and regulation in a power-
regulated society are determined by the political structure so that the policy sup-
ports institutional requirements.  Therefore, such policy is rational and justified 
from the power-regulated society’s point of view.  China’s media regulation poli-
cy, especially policies toward traditional media, is influenced by two thousand 
years of totalitarian culture and politics.  During the institutional transformation, 
these characteristics have been harshly criticized by international institutions and 
also domestic scholars.82 
 
B. Media Policy in Rights-Regulated Societies 
 
First, the purposes of media in a rights-regulated society are to serve holders 
of private rights and to monitor the regime of power.  As we have discussed 
above, a rights-regulated society needs strong government—an authority of pow-
er to maintain a national defense and to protect private rights from the exploita-
tion of the members of the society.  Thus, one function of the political structure of 
a rights-regulated society uses the organization and optimization of such a gov-
ernment.  So far, the democratic political structure and rule of law have been con-
sidered the most successful and popular social structures for a rights-regulated 
society.  The scholars in Four Theories of The Press said, “Democracy from the 
beginning has defended the rights of men to disagree—with each other, with their 
government, with religions.  Democracy has developed in such a path that free 
men are often unable to agree on common objectives, or even on the amount of 
freedom men should have.”83  
This is correct when looking at the superficial phenomena, but we should not 
forget that democracy actually stands on laws created from mutual agreements, 
not disagreements.  Therefore, if social members show their disagreements by 
unlawful methods, they will be punished according to the law.84 
 
81 See HE, supra note 69, at 68.  He Qinglan argued, 
To enable the state apparatus to function normally, the Chinese government has to give its officials 
access to relatively accurate information that tells them what is going on in this vast nation.  It has, there-
fore, established a stringent system of “internal documents” and a series of all-encompassing laws and 
regulations regarding the secrecy of information. 
Id. 
82 See ISABELLA BENNETT, MEDIA CENSORSHIP IN CHINA (2011), http://sites.asiasociety.org/asia21su 
mmit/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Media-Censorship-in-China-Council-on-Foreign-Relations.pdf. 
83 SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 1, at 107. 
84 See Carey L. Biron, U.S. Prison Population Seeing “Unprecedented Increase,” IPS (Feb. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/u-s-prison-population-seeing-unprecedented-increase/.  The article quoted 
several relevant figures: 
Over the past 30 years, according to a new report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the 
federal prison population has jumped from 25,000 to 219,000 inmates, an increase of nearly 790 percent.  
Swollen by such figures, for years the United States has incarcerated far more people than any other coun-
try, today imprisoning some 716 people out of every 100,000. 
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Second, media content in a rights-regulated society is typically unfiltered 
truth as opposed to pro-government propaganda.  In a rights-regulated society, 
members compete for trading advantages by innovating better products via tech-
nological development. Truth and knowledge are indispensable for the develop-
ment of technology and healthy markets.  This differs from power-regulated soci-
eties which disseminate acceptable speech but censor unacceptable speech.  In 
rights-regulated societies, ethics and common practice dictates the communica-
tion of uncensored information to the public.  
A fundamental component of a rights-regulated society’s media is investiga-
tion and communication of the truth, while opinions fall into a separate category 
not defined by the usual criteria of factuality.  By clearly separating opinions 
from fact, the rights-regulated society can be much more tolerant towards even 
the most unpopular opinions.  As the United States Supreme Court held in Snyder 
v. Phelps: 
 
Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them to 
tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great 
pain.  On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by 
punishing the speaker.  As a Nation we have chosen a different 
course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure 
that we do not stifle public debate.85 
 
The pursuit of truth naturally generates a marketplace of ideas because such a 
marketplace is the only way to discover and examine truths.  As Justice Holmes 
stated in his dissenting opinion of Abrams v. United States: 
 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical.  If you have no doubt of your premises or your power 
and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally ex-
press your wishes in law and sweeping all opposition. . . . But 
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired 
is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out.86 
 
Third, media industries in a rights-regulated society that exist independent of 
and without input from the regime of power are referred to as the “free media” 
 
Id. 
85 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011). 
86 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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model.  Because scarce resources are distributed according to private rights in-
stead of power, enterprises are the institutions created to minimize the transac-
tional costs of private rights, according to Ronald Coase’s transaction cost theo-
ry.87  Media industries also follow the doctrines of the market economy in a 
rights-regulated society.  Media industries that operate independent of the regime 
of power, however, are a relatively new phenomenon; historically, media indus-
tries have not had this independence.  For example, in Great Britain, media indus-
tries faced two main obstacles.  One was the administrative monopoly controlled 
by the royal family that gave media licenses to a limited number of businesses, 
conditional on the business’s willingness to report favorable information about 
the regime.88  Another obstacle was the difficulty of entering the market—high 
costs and limited niches acted as a constraint on potential media enterprises.  
With the development of press technology and increasing demand for books,89 
these obstacles gradually decreased, putting great pressure on the administrative 
monopoly from capitalists who were now able to enter the market.   As a result of 
such capitalistic competition, a typical competitor emerged in the form of the 
penny paper, which could undercut the competition by selling at low prices.90  
Today, in rights-regulated societies, the independence of media enterprises from 
regimes of power is commonplace—the United States is a perfect example of this 
freedom.91 
Fourth, as opposed to being an instrument of upholding moral competition, as 
in power-regulated societies, media in rights-regulated societies utilize market-
oriented content and vulgarity.  In a rights-regulated society, media enterprises 
compete for popularity to gain profits; this differs from the business model of 
media entities in power-regulated societies.  In a rights-regulated society, the so-
cial members are liberated from moral competition and earn livelihoods through 
market trading.  Human nature leads them to consume content that caters to their 
interests rather than content shaped by the regime of power.  Therefore, the con-
tent of media becomes unavoidably vulgar.  For instance, the penny newspapers 
in Great Britain and the United States experienced a period of filthy or vulgar 
content when the newspapers were independent from governmental or political 
subsidies, operating only in public markets.92 
 
87 See supra Part III.A. 
88 See generally, Roger Parry, The Ascent of Media: From Gilgamesh to Google via Gutenberg 
(2011); Dan Meyer, Upside Down: How We Can Avoid Becoming the United States of China (2016). 
89 See generally, Sarah Niblock, Journalism: A Beginner’s Guide (2010). 
90 See generally MICHAEL SCHUDSON, WHY DEMOCRACIES NEED AN UNLOVABLE PRESS 43 (2008) 
(In the United States, “[b]eginning in the 1830s, a new breed of urban paper, the so-called “penny press,” 
discovered that one could make money by printing local news as well as national political news, by hawk-
ing newspapers on the street and not selling by subscription only and by lowering the price of a copy from 
6 cents to a penny or two.”). 
91 See generally SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 1, at 92 (“In the most democratic societies, the chief in-
strument of control is the judicial system. In the United States the courts are paramount since they not only 
apply the law of the land to the press but also determine when the other branches of government are over-
stepping their authority in imposing restrictions which might contravene constitutional protections.”). 
92 See JAMES CURRAN, MEDIA AND POWER 92 (2002).  James Curran explained the shift toward vul-
garity: 
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The content of network new media in China has been inevitably vulgarized 
by the driving force of the market, which has caused concerns from the regime of 
power.  The vulgar media content negatively impacts the regime’s upheld moral 
standards and drives the media to compete for popularity within the market re-
gardless of moral popularity.  This issue of emerging media network endangers 
the legitimacy of the regime.  In addition to bringing about the change in content 
and competition, network new media also provokes the public to demand more 
freedom of expression.  Therefore, the regime of power in China seeks to weed 
out lewd and vulgar content on the Internet with the content purity campaigns.93  
During institutional transformation, the battle for content between online enter-
prises and the regime of power is actually between the natural path of media—in 
a rights-regulated society—and the moral requirement of the regime of power—in 
a power-regulated society.  For this purpose, content purity campaigns can be 
viewed as speed bumps on the road towards transformation—their function is 
only to slow down progress rather than changing its direction entirely. 
Finally, in a rights-regulated society, the content of media is generally not 
enamored by the regime of power.  In a rights-regulated society, the regime of 
power is just a public service provider rather than the sole allocator of resources.  
That is, the regime provides national defense and a fair system of competition for 
resources, but not the resources themselves.  The regime of power is not inherent-
ly fair and just, which necessitates control and regulation by the public through 
the democratic process and the rule of law.  Therefore, the questions of what the 
regime does and will do are of interest to the public.  Scandals, in particular, will 
garner attention from the public.  In a rights-regulated society, the media indus-
try’s main revenue stream is created by the consumption of newspapers and sub-
scriptions along with the popularity of their news content.  Specifically, the more 
traffic a media company gets to its media outlet, the more ad space or commer-
cials they can sell.  Therefore, for its own interests, the media industry will put 
significant resources into discovering scandals within the regime of power.  As 
Michael Schudson points out:  
 
Some of the greatest service the media provide for democracy 
lies in characteristics that a few people regard as very nice or 
ennobling about the press.  These features of journalism—and 
perhaps these features more than others—make news a valuable 
 
[The] publisher of the Poor Man’s Guardian, Destructive and London Dispatch, announced the 
change with characteristic aplomb, promising his readers “all the gems and treasures, and fun and frolic and 
news and occurrences of the week. . . . Police Intelligence, Murder, Rapes, Suicides, Burnings, Maimings, 
Theatricals, Races, Pugilism, and all manner of moving accidents by flood and field.  In short, it will be 
stuffed with every sort of devilment that will make it sell. . . Our object is not to make money, but to beat 
the Government.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
93 See generally China urges Websites to filter all vulgar contents under threat of site shut-down, 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 3, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/03/content_1075316 
0.htm. 
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force in a democratic society, and this means that—if all goes 
well—we are saddled with a necessary institution we are not 
likely ever to love.94 
 
In summation, government autonomy and controversial content are distin-
guishing characteristics of a free media model in a rights-regulated society. These 
traits are determined by market competition and political structure. These charac-
teristics have unavoidably emerged and blossomed in China’s new media, emerg-
ing in the newly competitive market economy and challenging the traditional me-
dia industry. 
 
C. Geopolitical Factors and Media Policy 
 
Aside from the media policy differences between the two types of societies, 
geopolitics and security also influence these policy decisions.  Geopolitical situa-
tions and sovereign security influence media policy through competition from 
international and domestic competitors.  The creation of institutions is a result of 
the types of competition we have previously discussed; the varying intensity of 
competition definitely affects the structure of a country’s institutions and media 
policies. 
As a typical example of geopolitics affecting a state, Otto Hintze made a rel-
evant distinction between Great Britain and the continental European states: 
 
The different systems of government and administration found 
among the large European states can be traced back in the main 
to two types, one of which can be called the English and the oth-
er the continental. . . . [The principal difference between them] 
consists in the fact that on the continent military absolutism with 
a bureaucratic administration emerges, while in England. . . .the 
older line of development continues. . .and leads to what we 
usually term parliamentarism and self-government.  What then is 
the cause of this pronounced institutional differentiation? . . . 
The reason lies above all in the fact that on the continental com-
pelling political imperatives held sway which led to the devel-
opment of militarism, absolutism and bureaucracy, whereas such 
pressures were not present in England. . . . It was above all geo-
graphic position that had its effects.95 
 
 
94 SCHUDSON, supra note 90, at 73. 
95 THOMAS ERTMAN, BIRTH OF THE LEVIATHAN: BUILDING STATES AND REGIMES IN MEDIEVAL AND 
EARLY MODERN EUROPE 11 (1997) (quoting OTTO HINTZE, MACHTPOLITIK UND REGIERUNGSVERFAS-
SUNG (1913)). 
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While many factors are related to the development of Great Britain and the 
formation of its unique institutions, it is still true that the English Channel has 
played a key role in its national security.96 
Ancient China did not have such naturally occurring defensive infrastruc-
tures, because China is not an island.  Therefore, according to Otto Hintze’s 
judgment, China would have a natural tendency to form into an absolutism 
state.97  As Thomas Ertman pointed out when he analyzed Otto Hintze’s argu-
ment:  
 
[T]he greater the degree of geographic exposure to which a giv-
en medieval or early modern state was subjected, the greater the 
threat of land warfare; and the greater the threat of land warfare, 
the greater the likelihood that the ruler of the state in question 
would successfully undermine representative institutions and lo-
cal self-government and create an absolutist state backed by a 
standing army and a professional bureaucracy in order to meet 
that land threat.98 
 
The mutual trust between ruler and public was poor in an absolutist state be-
cause the defending the ruler required efficiency in power and resource collec-
tion—leaving no time to negotiate with the leaders of the public.  The regime 
would fear that compromise and the uncertainty of the negotiation might threaten 
their regime and defenses.  Therefore, freedom of speech in an absolutist society 
had more deficiencies than merits.  
Mutual trust between a nation’s ruler and the public promotes freedom of 
speech.  Rulers would not have an interest in segregating small blocks of society 
in order to limit the flow of information because secrecy would be replaced with 
transparency.  Compared with continental European states, Great Britain has his-
torically been such a state.99  As David Landes commented:  
 
To begin with, Britain had the early advantage of being a nation.  
By that I mean not simply the realm of a ruler, not simply a state 
or political entity, but a self-conscious, self-aware unit character-
ized by common identity and loyalty and by equality of civil sta-
tus.  Nations can reconcile social purpose with individual aspira-




96 S. Stephen Acott, MPSC: The Saga of Sandy Clyburn 33 (2013). 
97 See ERTMAN, supra note 95, at 11–12. 
98 Id. 
99 See LANDES, supra note 11 at 219. 
100 Id. 
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Similar to Great Britain, the United States has a great geopolitical advantage 
in the modern world, which provides unmatchable confidence and space of de-
velopment for the American people and their government.  As former Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger said:  
 
[T]he European powers fought innumerable wars to prevent po-
tentially dominant powers from arising.  In America, the combi-
nation of strength and distance inspired a confidence that any 
challenge could be overcome after it had presented itself.  Euro-
pean nations, with much narrower margins of survival, formed 
coalitions against the possibility of change; America was suffi-
ciently remote to gear its policy to resisting the actuality of 
change.101  
 
The lack of competition from the outside world for nearly three hundred 
years strongly influenced the social climate towards freedom of speech and press 
in the United States.  This afforded more confidence toward the regime to com-
promise with the different forces in the country.  Henry Kissinger also said: 
 
America found that it would have to implement its ideals in a 
world less blessed than its own and in concert with states pos-
sessed of narrower margins of survival, more limited objectives, 
and far less self-confidence.  And yet America has persevered.  
The postwar world became largely America’s creation, so that, 
in the end, it did come to play the role Wilson had envisioned for 
it—as a beacon to follow, and a hope to attain.102 
 
Therefore, when a nation faces a variety of strong competing pressures, its 
media and speech policy will be adjusted accordingly. For example, in Schenck v. 
United States,103 the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the de-
fendants’ criminal conviction was constitutional and their conduct was not pro-
tected under the First Amendment.  The First Amendment does not protect speech 
encouraging insubordination, because, “[w]hen a nation is at war, many things 
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their ut-
terance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard 
them as protected by any constitutional right.”104  Since the same country will 
have different criteria on free speech at different times, it is natural that other 
countries will also have different criteria too, considering their different experi-
ences and culture. 
 
101 HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 31–32 (1994) (emphasis omitted). 
102 Id. at 55. 
103 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
104 Id. at 52. 
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For example, in Germany, which also upholds the freedom of speech as a 
constitutional principle, pro-Nazi speech is still banned.  “Germany's constitution 
strongly and explicitly protects the freedom of speech.  Still, the country's highest 
court has now said that—given the injustice and horrors of the Nazi regime—it is 
constitutional to make an exception that bans speech glorifying Hitler's ideolo-
gy.”105 As Anthony Lewis pointed: 
 
The United States differs from almost all other Western societies 
in its legal treatment of hate speech.  In Germany it is a crime, a 
serious one, to display the swastika or any other Nazi symbol.  
In eleven European countries it is a crime to say that the Holo-
caust did not happen, that Germans in the Nazi years did not 
slaughter Jews.  So it is in Canada, and the Canadian Supreme 
Court has decided that Holocaust deniers can be prosecuted and 
punished despite that country’s constitutional guarantee of free 
expression.  In the United States, the First Amendment protects 
the right to deny the fact of the Holocaust.106 
 
In summary, an ethical system faces constant pressures from geopolitics, 
leading to the development of technologies and institutions.  The diversity of 
competing environments, technology and institutions cultivates different policies 
and cultures that affect the norms of speech and media regulation.  Therefore, a 
nation can only build on its media policy and culture of speech from its historical 
experience.  Roger Errera, a French legal scholar and jurist, observed that Euro-
peans would not accept America’s tolerance toward hateful speech,107 as in Na-
tional Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie.108  “The American view 
must be based on ‘an inveterate social and historical optimism’—which Europe-
ans could not be expected to share after their tragic experience at the hands of the 









105 Dietmar Hipp, Germany’s Nazi Exception: Constitutional Court Oks Curtailing of Free Speech, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-s-nazi-exception-
constitutional-court-oks-curtailing-of-free-speech-a-662031.html. 
106 ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 157–58 (2007). 
107 See id. at 160. 
108 432 U.S. 43(1977). 
109 Id. 
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IV. THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF MEDIA POLICY IN CHINA 
 
A. China’s Institutional Transformation from a Power-Regulated Society to a 
Rights-Regulated Society 
 
In more than two thousand years of Chinese history, four periods of institu-
tional transformation have proved revolutionary and have fundamentally changed 
China’s society.  The first was the unification of China by Qin Dynasty in 221 
BC, which ended more than five hundred years of chaos among hundreds of 
states, and brought China under a totalitarian political structure.110  The second 
was the Xinhai revolution in 1911, led by Sun Yat-sen, which formally estab-
lished a republic that ended more than two thousand years of totalitarianism start-
ed by Qin Dynasty.111  The third is the foundation of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949, by which China entered into a Soviet style communist system with 
a central-planned economic model.112  The fourth was the reform and open policy 
in 1979, led by Deng Xiaoping, which caused China to transition from USSR 
style politics to a political structure based on a market economy and rule of 
law.113 
The last three institutional transformations happened within one hundred 
years of each other, and they can be understood as the three stages of one whole 
institutional revolution—from a power-regulated society to a rights-regulated 
society.  Therefore, the two thousand years of China’s history since the Qin Dyn-
asty could be divided into two distinct sections.  The first era, from the Qin Dyn-
asty until the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, could be defined as a power-regulated 
society.  The second era, from 1911 to present, could be described as an ongoing 
institutional transformation from a power-regulated society to a rights-regulated 
society. 
Competition is the fundamental force that drives institutions and technology 
to evolve and improve.  The institutional transformation of China since the end of 
the Qing Dynasty was triggered by the competitive pressure of globalization, ini-
tiated by the Western European countries. As Douglas North said:  
Since Charles Darwin, evolutionary theory has had a powerful influence upon 
our understanding of social survival. . . . The implications of the theory were that 
over time inefficient institutions are weeded out, efficient ones survive, and thus 
there is a gradual evolution of more efficient forms of economic, political, and 
social organization.114 
 
110 See EBERHARD, supra note 27, at 317. 
111 See Id. 
112 See Mo, supra note 67, at 12. 
113 See generally Changing China, In Depth: Deng Xiaoping, B.B.C. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared 
/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/key_people_events/html/6.stm (a special report identifying key members of 
China's Communist Party which overseen the country's transformation from war-racked poverty in 1949 to 
emerging Asian superpower). 
114 NORTH, supra note 2, at 92. 
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Bertrand Russell, comparing culture and institutions between China and the 
Western world—especially Great Britain—said, 
 
Unfortunately for China, its culture was deficient in one respect, 
namely, science . . .What makes us superior is Newton and Rob-
ert Boyle and their scientific successors.  They make us superior 
by giving us greater proficiency in the art of killing.  It is easier 
for an Englishman to kill a Chinaman than for a Chinaman to 
kill an Englishman.  Therefore our civilization is superior to that 
of China, and Chien Lung is absurd.115 
 
Before facing western pressures in the middle of the nineteenth century, Chi-
na had no strong rivals in Eastern Asia for hundreds of years.  Surrounding na-
tions lacked superior technology or institutions, even though the military pressure 
from northern nomads had existed occasionally.116  The first landmark of Western 
competitive pressure was the 1840 Opium Wars, which resulted in Hong Kong 
being ceded to the United Kingdom, resulting in a huge war indemnity and forc-
ing China to open several of its ports.117  With this first military conflict, the Chi-
nese government started to realize the importance of technology—especially that 
of weaponry.118  The Chinese regime changed their stifling technology policy to 
allow society to research and develop technologies, especially military technolo-
gies, for the purpose of national defense.119  Therefore, modern educational insti-
tutions emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century; in these institutions, 
science and technology were taught and developed.120  Scholars with knowledge 
of natural sciences and technology became the predominant intellectuals, like 
 
115 RUSSELL, supra note 32, at 48–49. 
116 See generally NICOLA DI COSMO, ANCIENT CHINA AND ITS ENEMIES: THE RISE OF NOMADIC 
POWER IN EAST ASIAN HISTORY (2002). 
117 See generally EBERHARD, supra note 27. 
118 See id. at 298–299.  Wolfram Eberhard explained: 
in 1839, [Lin Tse-hsu] prohibited the opium trade and burned the chests of opium found in British 
possession.  The British view was that to tolerate the Chinese action might mean the destruction of British 
trade in the Far East and that, on the other hand, it might be possible by active intervention to compel the 
Chinese to open other ports to European trade and to shake off the monopoly of the Canton merchants.  In 
1840 British ships-of-war appeared off the south-eastern coast of China and bombarded . . . it this first 
armed conflict with the West, China found herself defenseless owing to her lack of a navy, and it was also 
found that the European weapons were far superior to those of the Chinese.  In 1842 China was compelled 
to capitulate: under the Treaty of Nanking. 
Id. 
119 See LI CHIEN-NUNG, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF CHINA 1840–1928 (Ssu-Yu Teng and Jeremy 
Ingalls trans. eds., D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. 1956).  “The last forty years of the nineteenth century may be 
considered an era when the Chinese slowly studied ‘foreign matters’ and copied Western methods.  Never-
theless, China’s superficial imitation of the West could not produce an effect strong enough to resist foreign 
aggression.” Id. 
120 See id. at 101–02.  “The earliest realization that China needed to imitate Western methods came af-
ter the conclusion of Opium War. . . . Because China suffered greatly from the Opium War, some Chinese 
became aware that their country could never control her invaders until she had mastered their superior 
knowledge of technology. ”  Id. 
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Qian Xuesen, who was fully honored and considered a hero in Communist Chi-
na.121 
Accordingly, at the end of the Qing Dynasty, both the regime of power and 
the intellectuals agreed that China should increase its technological skill in order 
to compete with the West.122  After living under a power-regulated society for 
over two thousand years, the public was not yet ready to revolt against the Qing 
regime nor embrace democratic revolution.  Li Hongzhang, the Prime Minister, 
encouraged the study of Western technology and research, while keeping the po-
litical regime unchanged; this was the so-called ethos of “China’s learning is es-
sential, West’s learning is practical” or “learn from foreigners to compete with 
foreigners.”123  But the war between China and Japan in 1894 seriously impaired 
the moral foundation of the Qing regime, which triggered the people’s desire for 
institutional reformation,124 and overturned the minority-controlled power-
regulated society, the Manchus.  Unlike the Opium Wars, after this defeat, China 
realized that its weakness was not only because of inferior technology, but also 
because of government corruption and an obsolete political structure.125  China’s 
military was stronger than Japan’s, because China had purchased superior wea-
ponry from the West for decades.126  Additionally, Japan had been subordinate to 
China, and it had even copied China’s culture and institutions before restoring 
imperial rule under Emperor Meiji in 1868.127  Therefore, China’s defeat was a 
failure of the institution not the military.  In 1895 and 1898, scholar K’ang Yo-
wei gave a memoranda to the Emperor of China that explained why China needed 
radical reform.128  Since then, China has continued its long march towards institu-
tional transformation. 
Institutional transformation is a complicated and dangerous process; hence 
different countries have had different transformations depending on their circum-
stances.  Institutional reform has been attempted several times in China, but there 
have been severe setbacks. 
The first attempt at institutional transformation, called the political regime-
oriented transformation, occurred during the Xinhai revolution led by Sun Yat-
sen, the “Father of the Republic.”129  In this revolution, the Qing Dynasty was 
 
121 “In China, Mr. Qian was celebrated as the father of Chinese rocketry, the leader of the research 
that produced the nation’s first ballistic missiles, its first satellite and the Silkworm anti-ship missile.”  
Michael Wines, Qian Xuesen, Father of China’s Space Program, Dies at 98, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/world/asia/04qian.html. 
122 See FAN DAINIAN, CHINESE STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY, 322 (1996). 
123 11 The Cambridge History of China: Late Ch’ing 1800-1911 Part 2 at 201 (John Fairbank & 
Kwang-Ching Liu eds., 1980). 
124 See generally, S.C.M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 (2003). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Jacques Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization 290 (2d ed. 1982). 
128 EBERHARD, supra note 27, at 298. 
129 Sun Yat-sen designed three phases of development through which the Republic of China was to be 
cultivated.  They were the phase of struggle against the old system, the phase of educative rule, and the 
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overturned and the Republic government was founded.130  Even though the pow-
er-regulated regime collapsed, the rights-regulated society had no foundation to 
rise from, thus the competitive order of society was thrown into chaos.131 
Sun Yat-sen faced a dilemma because even though the power of the Qing re-
gime had been eradicated, private rights had not yet been cultivated.132  The en-
forcer was uprooted but not replaced.  Sun Yat-sen himself was forced to transfer 
the temporary presidency of the Republic of China to the biggest warlord, Yuan 
Shih-kai.133  Yuan’s regime was soon overturned by the united warlords of the 
southern provinces.134  The vacuum left by the collapse of the incumbent power 
caused many small regimes to emerge and compete; warlords kept the nation in a 
state of civil war until the founding of the Communist Party’s People’s Republic 
of China in 1949.135  The hundreds of wars among warlords and the weakness of 
the central government impaired China’s national defenses and led to the four-
teen-year Sino-Japanese war from 1931 to 1945.136 
The bitter lesson learned from the Xinhai revolution was that the order in so-
ciety could not be taken for granted, even though, for most of human history, so-
ciety was in a disordered state of nature.  Institutional transformation through 
revolution was risky and could cause serious side effects and unexpected conse-
quences. As economist Douglass North said, 
 
That the informal constraints are important in themselves . . . can 
be observed from the evidence that the same formal rules and/or 
constitutions imposed on different societies produce different 
outcomes. And discontinuous institutional change, such as revo-
lution of military conquest and subjugation, certainly produces 
new outcomes. But what is most striking . . . is the persistence of 
so many aspects of a society in spite of a total change in the 
rules.137 
 
phase of truly democratic government.  See WOLFRAM EBERHARD, A HISTORY OF CHINA 317 (E.W. Dick-
es trans., 4th ed. 1977). 
130 The educative rule phase was an authoritarian system with democratic characteristics, under which 
the people would be familiarized with democracy and would cultivate political growth for true democracy.  
See id. 
131 See id. at 315–16 (discussing the struggle between rival groups from 1912-1927 following the dis-
solving of class solidarity amongst the gentry). 
132 See id. 
133 See Wright, supra note 51 at 123.  As Wright describes: 
The collapse of Yuan’s regime led to a decade of chaos and division in China.  It produced a power 
vacuum that no regime could hope to fill, and China disintegrated into several geopolitical regions, all more 
or less dominated by military commanders dubbed ‘warlords’ by Western writers.  The warlord period was 
so confusing that most foreign government simply chose to recognize whichever regime occupied Beijing 
as the legitimate government of China. 
Id. 
134 Id. at 122–23. 
135 Id. at 123–24. 
136 LLOYD E. LEE, WORLD WAR II IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND THE WAR’S AFTERMATH, WITH 
GENERAL THEMES: A HANDBOOK OF LITERATURE AND RESEARCH 27 (1998). 
137 NORTH, supra note 2, at 36. 
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Simply, the conditions of a democratic society cannot be brought about 
through revolution because only competition based on private rights in a market 
economy can create the desired cultural and political structure. 
The 1966–1976 Cultural Revolution was the second attempt at institutional 
transformation.  This can be called the culture-oriented institutional transfor-
mation.  The establishment of the communist country in 1949 was not an institu-
tional transformation, but merely the rebuilding and unification of the past power-
regulated society that had been destroyed by the Xinhai Revolution in 1911.  
Therefore, Communist China was still a power-regulated society.  Development 
of the military industry became a priority due to the past weaknesses of China’s 
national defense.  This was considered the direct cause of all the misfortunes 
since the first war with Great Britain in 1840.  The ideology of Communism and 
the adoption of a Soviet political and economic model seemed like the right solu-
tion.  The Korean War, the end of the three-year famine in 1963, and the success-
ful nuclear bomb experiment in 1964 helped secure China’s national defense and 
social stability. 
Mao Tse-Tung inspired the second institutional transformation.  At a young 
age, Mao Tse-Tung realized that the two millennia of authoritarianism in China 
could not sustain a democratic society.138  His desire for a cultural revolution was 
systematically manifested in 1940, during the most difficult period of the anti-
Japanese war.139  Some intellectuals, such as Hu Shih and some former Chinese 
Communist Party leaders like Chen Tu-hsiu, significantly contributed to the in-
troduction of Western democracy in China.140  These efforts were called the Lit-
erary Revolution of the 1920s.141  Mao was active among the leaders that contrib-
uted to the introduction of Western democracy in China.  Therefore, when the 
social order had reached a permissible level of authority and national security was 
once again established, Mao began the institutional transformation from a cultural 
level.142 
The importance of culture in social norms is one thing, but to change the cul-
ture cannot be done quickly or easily. As Douglass North said:  
 
 
138 See generally MAO ZEDONG (毛泽东), XIN MINZHU ZHUYI LUN (新民主主义论) [On New 
Democracy] （Jan. 1940) in 2 MAO TSE-TUNG COLLECTIONS (Foreign Language Press (人民出版社) 
1991). 
139 See id. at 662–711. 
140 See EBERHAND, supra note 27, at 319.  “The journal ‘New Youth’ (‘Hsin Ch’ing-nien’), created in 
1915 by Chen Tu-hsiu (1879-1942), was progressive, against the monarchy, Confucius, and the old tradi-
tions. . . . Hu Shih (1892-1962) gained greatest acclaim by his proposal for a ‘literary revolution’ published 
in the ‘New Youth’ in 1917.”  Id. 
141 See id. 
142 See North, supra note 2, at 42.  Some elite scholars, such as Douglass North and Elinor Ostrom, 
have discussed the effect culture has on institutional transformation.  Douglass North emphasized that 
“[t]he way by which the mind processes information not only is the basis for the existence of institutions, 
but is a key to understanding the way informal constraints play an important role in the makeup of the 
choice set both in the short-run and in the long-run evolution of societies.  In the short run, culture defines 
the way individuals process and utilize information and hence may affect the way informal constraints get 
specified.” See id. 
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Equally important is the fact that the informal constraints that 
are culturally derived will not change immediately in reaction to 
changes in the formal rules.  As a result, the tension between al-
tered formal rules and the persisting informal constraints pro-
duces outcomes that have important implications for the way 
economies change.143 
 
Mao unified the mainland of China using military force under communist 
ideologies, and then he destroyed traditional Chinese culture through the Cultural 
Revolution.144  If we accept Henry Sumner Maine’s argument that “the movement 
of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Con-
tract,”145 then we can closely examine the Cultural Revolution.  Two main fea-
tures can be seen in the Cultural Revolution.  The first feature is that nearly all 
social members or institutes with superior political or social status were targeted 
by the revolutionaries.146  These people and institutes included founders of the 
regime, governmental organizations, government officers, intellectual scholars, 
and universities.  The second feature was Mao’s support and praise for riots under 
the presumption that “rebellion is reasonable.”147  The purpose of this slogan was 
to cultivate the ability of the Chinese people to rebel against any oppressive re-
gimes such as authoritarianism.  This effort was necessary because the main char-
acteristics of China’s traditional culture were subordination, fidelity, and self-
effacement.  The Cultural Revolution was another kind of liberalization by which 
the public attempted to free themselves from the burden of traditional authoritari-
an culture by destroying the pyramids of status and replacing it with egalitarian-
ism.  It also sought to replace the family-based ethical system with a more indi-
vidualistic model.148  In China’s recent history, the Cultural Revolution stands as 
a major social and political event; much effort needs to be devoted to studying the 
revolution and its aftermath.149  Obviously, the enormity of this issue goes beyond 
the scope of this article.  
Aside from that, the Cultural Revolution was an institutional transformation 
of an old power-regulated society being culturally uprooted and changed into a 
modern rights-regulated society.  The event might be considered a failure due to 
the social chaos and economic duress that followed, but time will tell if it was 
 
143 Id. at 45. 
144 See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 28, at 290–293. 
145 HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 100 (1960). 
146 See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 28, at 290–293. 
147 Id. 
148 See WRIGHT, supra note 51, at 162. 
149 See Id.  As David Wright points out: 
The Cultural Revolution was a complex phenomenon, and making sense of it is not an easy task.  In-
deed, several scholars who have devoted their careers to plumbing its depths have not been able to come to 
full grips with its causes and the course of its development.  The Cultural Revolution was more or less 
officially launched in mid-1966, but after that it seems to have assumed a momentum and meaning all its 
own, quite apart from what Mao originally foresaw or intended. 
Id. 
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worse or better in the long run.  It is possible that the revolution pushed China’s 
society forward and planted the seeds of democracy.  It is also doubtless that the 
Communist Party and Mao Tse-Tung himself were among the victims of the 
revolution, which maybe was an intended consequence of the revolution.  Elinor 
Ostrom pointed out the layers of norms that affect the society: 
 
All rules are nested in another set of rules that define how the 
first set of rules can be changed.  This nesting of rules within 
rules at several levels is similar to the nesting of computer lan-
guages at several levels. . . . Whenever one addresses questions 
about institutional changes, as contrasted to action within institu-
tional constraints, it is essential to recognize the following:  1. 
Changes in the rules used to order action at one level occur with-
in a currently ‘fixed’ set of rules at a deeper level.  2. Changes in 
deeper-level rules usually are more difficult and more costly to 
accomplish, thus increasing the stability of mutual expectations 
among individuals interacting according to a set of rules.150 
 
Without the Cultural Revolution, the reform and open policy might have tak-
en much longer to come to fruition.151 
The third attempt at institutional transformation was the reform and open pol-
icy in 1979.  After the previous attempts at institutional transformation were not 
successful, the regime of China gradually began to realize that the institutional 
transformation from a power-regulated society to a rights-regulated society need-
ed to begin from the grassroots152; the economic reformation needed to be fol-
lowed by cultural reformation and culminate into a political reformation.  The 
reform and open policy had remarkable differences from the previous institutional 
transformations.  The reform started from the basic economic surface of agricul-
tural reform in 1979, rather than political reform that had happened in the Xinhai 
revolution.153  For industrial and market reform, the reform started from some 
testing points—such as Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in the Guangdong prov-
ince and Xiamen in the Fujian province—and later spread to more inland areas.154  
Thus far, the bottom-up method of reform has made impressive gains.  In contrast 
 
150 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION 51–52 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 2003). 
151 See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 28, at 130.  As Kenneth Lieberthal summarizes, one of the four main 
conclusions that informed Deng Xiaoping’s specific reform efforts is: 
Deng concluded that after the disillusionment of Mao’s last years, ideological exhortations rang hol-
low, and that the Chinese people sought a higher standard of living.  Events during the 1970s had so eroded 
the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist party that a new source of confidence in the party’s right to rule 
would have to be found.  Deng decided that source must be more and better resources for the populace, and 
argued that the party’s only hope was the utilitarian principle that it could consistently “deliver the goods.” 
Id. 
152 Id. at 130–33. 
153 Id. at 136. 
154 Id. at 141. 
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to the Xinhai revolution, the reform and open policy still maintained the Com-
munist Party in order not to destabilize social order.155  As we discussed before, 
this was necessary.  As Douglass North pointed out, “[o]rder is a necessary (but 
not sufficient) condition for long-run economic growth.  It is equally a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for the establishment and maintenance of the variety 
of conditions underlying freedom of person and property that we associate with a 
consensual or democratic society.”156 
At the same time, the gradual step-by-step improvement in private rights, 
such as privatization of property and the cultivation of a market economy, has 
built up the infrastructure of a rights-regulated society in China.  As Francis Fu-
kuyama says, “Contemporary conventional wisdom has it that democracy will not 
emerge without the existence of a strong middle class, that is, a group of people 
who own some property and are neither elites nor the rural poor.”157  Therefore, 
because of the large population and unbalanced urban development, the cultiva-
tion of a substantial middle class and a progressive culture can take time to devel-
op. 
Modern China has many social and political phenomena that can be con-
strued as unusual or controversial.  This is the result of conflicting and incon-
sistent criteria for the performance of morality, politics, and culture.  These dif-
ferent criteria, in turn, stem from differences between the old power-regulated 
society and the potential for a rights-regulated society.  For instance, the Chinese 
Constitution acts as an institutional instrument for a rights-regulated society, but 
the Constitution is not fully implemented and obeyed even by the regime in pow-
er.158  Whether China should have a judicial review system for its constitution is 
still under heated debate.159  Another instance of conflict comes from China’s 
political structure in which there are institutionally parallel regimes of power 
where one heads the government and the other heads the Communist Party.  
There is the Communist Party of China—organized on the chart of the Party—but 
also the governmental regime—organized and structured by the Constitution and 
laws.  So far these two conflicting groups are merged by the Communist Party.  
The relationship between the two parallel regimes is a sensitive political issue.  It 
could be said that the two regimes are two representatives: one for the current 
power-regulated society and the other for the future rights-regulated society.  
What the Chinese society becomes in the future will be determined by the rela-
tions of these two regimes. 
 
155 Id. at 166–67. 
156 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 104 (2005). 
157 See FUKUYAMA, supra note 10, at 410. 
158 Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161399, at *15 
(SDNY Nov. 5, 2012) (“Even China's current constitution contains a number of apparently legally binding 
statements that are in practice not enforced by the courts”). 
159 See Thomas E. Kellogg, Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics? Constitutional Develop-
ment and Civil Litigation in China, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 215 (2009). 
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The People’s Congress, which is structured according to the Constitution,160 
is another example of conflicting principles in China.  In a democratic country, 
the congress is the political organ by which the public supervises and controls the 
power of regime.  Therefore, most of the members of congress should come from 
the public instead of from within the government.  But in China, most members 
are already governmental officials.161  They have dual status, being both the su-
pervisors and the supervisees.  This kind of congress is undoubtedly far from 
meeting the criteria and functionality of a democratic government.  One column-
ist has commented that it is more like a political farce.162  These comments are 
true to some extent from the democratic point of view.  But from the institutional 
transformation point of view, these duplicate models of democratic political struc-
tures might be shortcuts to democracy and the cultivation of elites.  This process 
goes from superficial to substantial, and from imitation to self-cultivation for 
democratic skills and cultures.  As Kenneth Lieberthal pointed out: 
 
Indeed, should a fully democratic system emerge in China by 
2020, it is most likely to be the result of unmanageable popular 
demands having produced a breakdown of the political system at 
some point before that date.  Given the vast complexity of the 
country and its political history, any democratic system growing 
out of this trauma is likely in 2020 to be institutionally weak and 
highly corrupt, with strong local forces testing the territorial in-
tegrity of the country around its margins.  Political parties would 
more likely represent localities than national social groups.163 
 
The current institutional transformation of China resembles things being 
transferred from an outdated basket to a new and appealing basket.  The old bas-
ket has become shabby and no longer functions properly but most things are still 
in it; the new one is still being woven and is still quite hollow inside.  During the 
transportation of the contents, an external power is needed to keep the old basket 
functioning and to weave the new one gradually as well as to move contents from 
 
160 See XIANFA (宪法) art. 2, § 2 (1982) (China) ("The organs through which the people exercise state 
power are the National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at different levels."). 
161 According to the statistics of China Central Television, 34.88% of the 2,987 members in the 
Twelfth National People’s Congress of China are governmental or communist party officials.  The National 
Party and Government Officials to Reduce the Proportion of Nearly Percent, CNTV NEWS CHANNEL, Feb. 
27, 2013, http://news.cntv.cn/2013/02/27/ARTI1361930998440696.shtml.  
162 George Ding, Explaining China’s National People’s Congress, VICE, Mar. 19, 2013, 
http://www.vice.com/read/behind-the-two-meetings-china (“[W]hen it comes to political theater, nobody 
does it better than the Communist Party of China.  Sure, they lack the production values of the United 
States and the method acting of North Korea, but the CPC more than makes up for it in scale and grandiosi-
ty. . . . The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held last November was a meeting of 
the CPC, where Xi was “elected” as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and the 
Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, the two posts in the party apparatus that actually mat-
ter.  By contrast, the "two meetings," which ended their two-week run Sunday, are not meetings of the 
CPC, but of the actual Chinese government, which is controlled by the CPC.  Confused yet?”). 
163 LIEBERTHAL, supra note 28, at 335. 
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the old to new basket.  This is what the Communist Party, as the sole authority in 
China, has been doing and should continue to do.  Media is one of the critical 
tools used to weave the new basket and to carry things over to it. 
 
B. Media Policy in the Process of Institutional Transformation 
 
Media is a key instrument in the formation of society because it can com-
municate necessary information, inspire cooperation, and facilitate collective ac-
tions.  Whether the government or public controls the media, it has an implication 
on the wider political environment of society.  In a power-regulated society, the 
government controls the content of media through the power-controlled media 
model.  For a rights-regulated society, the public controls the media content.  This 
is called the free media model. Since China was the most successful and typical 
power-regulated society, its media policy was a typical power-controlled media 
model, especially before 1979.  The US is currently the most powerful and typical 
rights-regulated society and the American media policy is a typical free media 
model.  
There are ideological differences between the two models of media.  Scholar 
Fred Siebert has described the scenario of the media from the two extremes of the 
USSR and the United States meeting: 
 
On the rare occasions when United States and Soviet newspa-
permen come together to discuss mass communication, the talk 
is apt to be both amusing and frustrating; for it becomes obvious 
in the first few minutes that the two frames of reference are in-
compatible.  The American feels blessed with his free press, and 
is inclined to sympathize with his Soviet colleague who groans 
under state ownership, censorship, and propaganda.  The Soviet 
representative, on the other hand, claims that he is blessed with 
the only true freedom of the press, whereas his unfortunate 
American colleague is compelled to serve a press that is venal, 
controlled by special interests, corrupt, and irresponsible.164 
 
Which side is more persuasive?  It depends.  The argument between the 
American and USSR media workers was typical of conflicts, as described above, 
between the differing ideologies on both extremes of the spectrum.  For the 
American side, the condition is that the mass public has enough ability and inter-
est to oversee the media’s behavior; if the media was too heavily influenced by 
special interest groups, media outlets would be punished by the public through 
boycotting or other reduced consumption.165  For the USSR, the condition neces-
 
164 SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 1, at 105. 
165 See id., at 60 ("The spread of objective reporting throughout American journalism was accelerated 
by the decline in political partisanship in the press and by the change of the newspaper . . . . The growth of 
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sitated that the regime of power was honest and integrated for the welfare of the 
whole society rather than for only self-interest.  Neither of two conditions are 
easily met.  Is it easier to find one good leader or to educate the population as a 
whole as rational citizen for private right holders?  Different countries obviously 
have different answers in accordance to their different historical, natural, and ge-
ographic conditions.  
Currently, China’s media policy and regulation is in a dynamic position be-
tween the two poles.  The dual features of both models of media policy exist in 
China’s media regulations and they are sometimes at odds with each other, espe-
cially in the case of regulation of new network media. 
 
1. The Remarkable Features of Internet Enterprises in China 
 
The traditional media, including newspapers, journals, magazines, publica-
tions, and broadcasts, has been restricted and regulated by the Chinese govern-
ment.166  This practice has characteristics of a power-controlled media model but 
faces serious competing pressure from market forces.  The network new media 
fundamentally differs from traditional media in ways that critically challenge the 
media policy in China.  These differences stem from the transnational, user-
generated, and independent nature of new network media.  In China, the remarka-
ble features of internet enterprises are their newness within the market economy 
environment and their financial independence from the regime of power. 
The regime of power in China faces increased difficulty in restricting and 
regulating the network new media.  Traditional media is generally regional; a 
country can exclude the content of tangible foreign media by means of customs or 
import bans.  For example, in China, all tangible media products such as books, 
journals, newspapers, CDs, and films need government approval before entering 
China.167  As for broadcasted content, the Chinese government has the ability to 
stop retransmission of the content by regulating and monitoring the reception of 
Direct-Broadcast Satellite antennas that receive the transmissions within China’s 
territory.168  The transnational characteristic of network new media makes the 
above measures of regulation much more difficult today.  The massive amount of 
content available online coupled with the intricacy of the web makes blocking 
and supervising specific content nearly impossible.  Furthermore, the public pres-
sure against censorship is much higher today than ever before because any indi-
 
advertising and the drive to increase circulations also contributed to the general acceptance of the ideal of 
objectivity."). 
166 Benia Xu, Media Censorship in China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515 ("The Chinese government has long kept tight 
reins on both traditional and new media to avoid potential subversion of its authority."). 
167 Patrick Frater, China Unveils Tough Controls on Foreign Media Activities, VARIETY (Feb. 22, 
2016, 5:08 AM PT) http://variety.com/2016/biz/asia/china-controls-foreign-media-activities-1201711580/. 
168 See Xu, supra note 166. 
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vidual can directly feel the information they are trying to access is being cen-
sored.169 
The characteristics of independent online enterprises also contribute to the 
difficulty of content regulation in China.  Aside from network new media, all tra-
ditional media enterprises in China are state owned.170  The government can easi-
ly intervene to regulate the content of the traditional media through their financial 
and administrative power over the enterprise.  Anyone who disobeys regulations 
could be removed from the enterprises.171  Furthermore, senior managers at these 
enterprises are pressured to comply with the regime in order to keep their posi-
tions safe and have opportunities for advancement.172 
Unlike traditional media enterprises, the management teams of the network 
new media enterprises are more sensitive to market profits than to awards from 
the regime of powers.  Firstly, the final authority in a network new media compa-
ny is its shareholders, not the government.  Therefore, keeping profits as high as 
possible is the mission of the management teams for the network new media 
companies, rather than following the government’s wishes.173  This means that 
the competing rules of the private-rights-regulated societies play a much stronger 
role in such enterprises.  The power of the market challenges the power of the 
government.  The operators of network new media do not participate in the com-
petition for glory or loyalty but, instead, they compete for market profit via gue-
rilla battles with the governmental supervisors. 
Secondly, for state-owned enterprises, the desires of the regime can easily 
pass on to the enterprises by internal channels because nearly all the senior man-
agers of state-owned enterprises are also part of the bureaucracy.174  However, 
there are no such channels for new network media enterprises.  Therefore, the 
regime of power needs to implement their desires through laws or regulations, 
even though such laws are still too general, simplistic, and allow too much discre-
 
169 See Gary King et al., How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collec-
tive Expression, 1 AM. POL. SCI. REV., May 2013, at 326 (2013).  As Gary King points out: 
Human expression is censored in Chinese social media in at least three ways, the last of which is the 
focus of our study.  First is “The Great Firewall of China,” which disallows certain Web sites from operat-
ing in the country. . . . Second is “keyword blocking” which stops a user from posting text that contain 
banned words or phrases. . . . Once past the first two barriers to freedom of speech, the text gets posted on 
the Web and the censors read and remove those they find objectionable. 
Id. at 328. 
170 See Xu, supra note 166. 
171 See HE, supra note 69, at 44.  As He Qinglian explained: 
Journalists and editors must also have a good political record.  If one of their news reports breaks a 
rule, they are liable to punishment commensurate with the seriousness of the offenses.  The heaviest admin-
istrative penalty is dismissal or having entered into one’s file the statement that “this person is unsuitable 
for cultural dissemination work.” 
Id. 
172 See id. 
173 For example, the Co-Founder, Chairman, and CEO of Baidu.com, Li Robin, has appeared on the 
richest people list in China for several years according to Forbes’s annual compilations. China Rich List, 
FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/robin-li/?list=china-billionaires (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
174 KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, MANAGING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: HOW TO ACHIEVE CORPORATE SUC-
CESS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, 50–52 (2011). 
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tion for the government to adjust the content through case-by-case review.  The 
move towards controlling content via laws rather than internal and opaque chan-
nels is still a progressive step in Chinese society.  The legislative procedure and 
context of laws and regulations are still distant from other nations’ rule of law and 
regulation regarding new network media.  As Francis Fukuyama pointed out:  
 
The rule of law can be said to exist only where the preexisting 
body of law is sovereign over legislation, meaning that the indi-
vidual holding political power feels bound by the law.  This is 
not to say that those with legislative power cannot make new 
laws.  But if they are to function within the rule of law, they 
must legislate according to the rules set by the preexisting law 
and not according to their own volition.175 
 
But when the supervising government discusses and debates the legality and 
compliance of content surrounding regulations, it is a step towards a lawful politi-
cal frame.  This is particularly evident when considering that while the Christian 
world followed a near-universal biblical code, China never had any document that 
could provide such structure.176 
 
2. Specific Characteristics of China’s Media Policy in the Institutional  
Transformation Period 
 
This paper has discussed that three main factors are closely related to the reg-
ulation and policy of media for a country: the type of society, that is, whether it is 
a power-regulated society or a rights-regulated society; the geopolitical security 
for the country; and the competitive pressure from different powers international-
ly or domestically.  All three factors center on the concept of competition.  China 
is transforming from a power-regulated society to a rights-regulated society.  
China also has unique geopolitical features and faces enormous international and 
domestic pressure.  Therefore, China’s regulation and policy towards media has 
its own particular characteristics in which both the state-controlled media model 
and the free media model overlap.  These models conflict and compromise with 
each other and the weight between them adjusts according to the progress of insti-
tutional transformation. 
 
175 FUKUYAMA, supra note 10, at 246. 
176 Id. at 248–49.  As Francis Fukuyama explained the superior authority of the Chinese Communist 
Party to any other institution in China: 
A good example is the People’s Republic of China.  There is no true rule of law in China today:  the 
Chinese Communist Party does not accept the authority of any other institution in China as superior to it or 
able to overturn its decisions.  Although the PRC has a constitution, the party makes the constitution rather 
than the reverse. . . . Dynastic China did not have a rule of law any more than Communist China. 
Id. 
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Firstly, modern China has moved away from its Soviet-style roots and has 
been progressing towards a rights-regulated society since the 1979 reform and 
open policy.  Furthermore, China has begun the process of establishing a market 
economy and democratic political structure.  Therefore, private rights have been 
under cultivation and have had greater and greater influence on the media regula-
tions.  For example, before 1990, China did not have a copyright legal system for 
nearly 40 years after the founding of the communist regime.177  During that time, 
no copyright protection existed in China; even media frequently included copy-
righted material without permission.178  The authors were considered the employ-
ees of the government, or the organizations attached to the government, and were 
paid monthly salaries instead of royalties.179  The independent authors, if they 
existed, had almost no channels by which to publish their works and thus could 
not make a living through the creation and sale of works.  Therefore, in such a 
power-regulated society, private rights played no role in content regulation.  
Many countries with this model still exist, such as North Korea and Iran.  Like 
China in earlier times, both North Korea and Iran are typical power-regulated 
societies.  In North Korea, the content of the media is strictly controlled and regu-
lated by the regime based only on the regime of power’s volition.180  In Iran, pri-
vate rights, such as copyrights, also have very little function in the regulation of 
content.181  Simply speaking, in such a political regime, the social members have 
no freedom to criticize the government, but have the freedom to freely use others’ 
works. 
Furthermore, copyright laws as a private rights regulation paradigm in China 
have been gradually created since 1979.  The first copyright law of 1990 was cre-
ated for the purpose of attracting foreign investment and the exchange of technol-
ogy.182 The competitive pressure from the international society forced China to 
open its doors and invite foreign investment and technology.183  Foreign enter-
prises that held capital and technology, however, needed predictable and compa-
 
177 See generally SHEN RENGAN (沈仁干), BAN QUAN LUN (版权论) [ON COPYRIGHT] (Haitian Chu 
Ban She (海天出版社) 2001) (discussing the promulgation of the Copyright Law of China in 1990). 
178 Stephen McIntyre, Trying to Agree on Three Articles of Law: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in 
Chinese Copyright Law, 1 CYBRARIS 62, 71–73 (2010). 
179 Id. 
180 North Korea's Tightly Controlled Media, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2011) http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-asia-pacific-16255126. 
181 Iran has not yet joined in the Berne Convention.  See WIPO-Administered Treaties Contracting 
Parties/Signatories Berne Convention, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/ 
en/wipo_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=15&group_id=1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
182 It was said that what triggered the promulgation of the Copyright Law of China in 1990 was the 
Sino-American Cooperation Agreement on High Energy Physics, signed in 1979, when Deng Xiaoping 
visited the United States.  In the documents, the concept “copyright” appeared, which pushed China to 
study the copyright legal system and promulgate the law more than ten years later.  See SHEN (沈仁干), 
supra note 177, at 259. 
183 Stephen McIntyre, The Yang Obeys, but the Yin Ignores: Copyright Law and Speech Suppression 
in the People's Republic of China, 29 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 75, 127 (2011) ("Probably the most significant 
reason for the increased congruence between copyright and SHDF was foreign influence.  From 1989 to 
1996, the United States exerted concentrated pressure on China to improve its protection of intellectual 
property, and the two nations were in almost constant dialogue on the subject."). 
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rable laws.  Therefore, a package of laws, including copyright laws, were drafted 
and promulgated.184  The foreign investment enterprises in China were given spe-
cial treatment as many of the laws and regulations were created specifically for 
their protection, rather than for domestic enterprises in China.185  The start of pri-
vate-rights regulation in China started in specific places such as Shenzhen186 and 
later spread everywhere in China; the spread of private rights also moved from 
some specific markets, such as international business and investment, but pro-
gressively encompassed all business.187  In 2001, after accession into the World 
Trade Organization (WTO),188 the obvious gap between China’s copyright laws 
and international copyright protection, if contextually analyzed through the law, 
was narrow.  The special treatment for foreign copyright holders diminished in 
light of the fair play requirement of the WTO.189  The development of copyright 
laws in China signifies the ways in which private rights became a source of order 
for content regulation.  Since 2008, in which the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy was published,190 the development of intellectual property (IP) law—
including Copyright Law in China—has been following the market requirements 
of China rather than international pressure.191 The need for private rights protec-
tion and domestic trade for Chinese authors and enterprises is becoming a driving 
force for the coming amendment of copyright laws.192  The rights-regulated socie-
ty model has been continuing to form in China.  
 
184 See id. at 110–15. 
185 Id. 
186 Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection 
of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 317, 335 n.94 (2008) ("In fact, before the 1988 
Amendment, several places in China such as Shenzhen, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Xiamen, and Shanghai had 
adopted local regulations experimenting with the transferability of land use rights."). 
187 Id. at 335–37. 
188 WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China's Accession, WTO NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011) 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm. 
189 See Summary of Dispute, WTO Legal Affairs Decision, China—Intellectual Property Rights 
(2014), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds362sum_e.pdf; see generally 
Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R, (adopted Mar. 20, 2009)), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e 
/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds362sum_e.pdf (acknowledging China’s right to prohibit some, but not all, foreign 
copyrights under the Berne Convention). 
190 Guojia Zhishichanquan Zhanlue Gangyao (国家知识产权战略纲要) [Outline of the National In-
tellectual Property Strategy] (promulgated by the St. Council, June 25, 2008, effective June 25,2008) ST. 
COUNCIL GAZ., June 25, 2008, at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=859 (China). 
191 The Trademark Law has been amended three times since 2008.  See Zhang Mao, China’s New 
Trademark Law, WIPO MAGAZINE (Sept. 2014), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2014/05 
/article_0009.html.  The Patent Law was being considered for a fourth amendment at the beginning of 
2016.  See Michael Lin, China Release Proposed Amendments to Patent Laws, IP WATCHDOG (Dec. 18, 
2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/12/18/chinese-patent-law-amendments-proposed/id=63981/.  The 
Copyright Law is in the process of a third amendment.  See Paolo Beconcini, China: Draft of the Amend-
ment to the Copyright Law, MONDAQ, (July 25, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/china/x/33025 
2/Copyright/Draft+Of+The+Amendment+To+The+Copyright+Law. 
192 In the third amendment, the first and second drafts of the copyright law have been published for 
public comments and suggestions, and many scholars, copyright holders and enterprises joined the heated 
discussion and debate about some articles such as collective management of copyrights.  This was not very 
common in China because for a long time, the legislation had closed doors, with little transparency and 
sometimes completely secret.  The text of the second draft of the copyright law is available for public re-
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Moreover, the right of privacy and reputation are much more complicated 
than copyright law.  The reason for this is that personal interests in privacy and 
reputation are closely intertwined with the regime of power’s interests.  For in-
stance, the Chinese concept of privacy was historically very weak except when it 
related to sex.193  One main reason is that the protection for privacy could be an 
obstacle for the implementation of power by the rulers.  Therefore, in a power-
regulated society, no regime of power could tolerate such private rights existing.  
As this paper has discussed, in a power-regulated society, the information be-
tween the ruler and the public is transparent in only one direction.194  Until 2008, 
when the Tort Law of China was promulgated, the right to privacy was a legiti-
mate interest independently placed first on a list of private rights needing to be 
protected.195  Before this law, the right to privacy was not an independent legal 
concept protected by law; the violation of privacy was not a legal cause for judi-
cial remedy in China.196 
Also, distinct from the right to privacy, the right to reputation has been pro-
tected by law since the beginning of the reformation and open policy in China.197  
One explanation for this is that human dignity and reputation were thrown into 
chaos during the Cultural Revolution.  The strong protections for reputation and 
dignity of citizens given by the constitution and civil law, arguably, were meant 
to correct the wrongdoings of the past.  But this logical application of corrective 
policy has not been consistently applied to the right of privacy.  Specifically, pri-
vacy, as the core of human dignity, was also seriously violated in the ten years of 
 
views on the National Copyright Office Website.  Copyright Law of People’s Republic of China (Bill to 
Amend the Second Draft), NAT’L COPYRIGHT ADMIN. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (July 2012), 
http://www.ncac.gov.cn/chinacopyright/contents/483/17753.html. 
193 See Bo Zhao, Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy in China: the Dead, the Law, and 
the Social Transition, 39 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 269, 305–08 (2014). 
194 See supra Part III.A.  To spy on an emperor was a serious offense in many power-regulated socie-
ties.  In China, it was punishable by death. 
195 See Qin Quan Ze Ren Fa (侵权责任法) [Tort Law of the People's Republic of China], (promulgat-
ed by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 23, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7846&CGid=.  Specifically, Article 2 of Chapter I 
states: 
Those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be subject to the tort liability according to this 
Law. 
“Civil rights and interests” used in this Law shall include the right to life, the right to health, the right 
to name, the right to reputation, the right to honor, right to self-image, right of privacy, marital autonomy, 
guardianship, ownership, usufruct, security interest, copyright, patent right, exclusive right to use a trade-
mark, right to discovery, equities, right of succession, and other personal and property rights and interests. 
Id. at chapter I, art. 2.  
196 The privacy in communications or correspondence is protected in the Constitution of China, but 
with some exceptions for implementation of powers.  See XIANFA (宪法) art. 40, § 2 (1982) (China) (“The 
freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens of the People's Republic of China are protected by law.  
No organization or individual may, on any ground, infringe upon the freedom and privacy of citizens' cor-
respondence except in cases where, to meet the needs of state security or of investigation into criminal 
offences, public security or prosecutorial organs are permitted to censor correspondence in accordance with 
procedures prescribed by law.”) (translation provided by the author). 
197 See id. art. 38, § 2 (1982) (China) (“The personal dignity of citizens of the People's Republic of 
China is inviolable.  Insult, libel, false charge or frame-up directed against citizens by any means is prohib-
ited.”) (translation provided by the author). 
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chaos.  Another reason for the differing treatments of reputation and privacy 
could be that the protection of reputation complies with the interest of a power-
regulated society and the protection of privacy does not.  
As this paper has discussed, a power-regulated society relies on a type of 
moral competition.  By competing for glory in a market created by the regime of 
power, the selfishness of individuals can be minimized.  The administration of 
society according to the volition of the regime was made easier by this enforced 
moral competition.  Therefore, honor and reputation overlap and even form the 
two sides of the coin in a power-regulated society.  The purpose and method of 
protection for reputation in a power-regulated society differs considerably from a 
rights-regulated society.  In a power-regulated society, the protection of reputa-
tion exists for the purpose of maintaining the order of an honorable society.  The 
more successful figures in the power-regulated society will be more honorable 
and their reputation will be more protected.  In the judicial decisions related to the 
protection of reputation going back to 1979, public figures, such as governmental 
officials and celebrities, would get more protection in disputes relating to defama-
tion or libel.  For instance, in 1989, Xu Liang sued the Shanghai Culture and Art 
Newspaper Company for defamation.198  Xu Liang was a one-legged war hero 
and a well-known singer in those years.  In both the judicial decision of Shanghai 
High Court and the Judicial Response of the Supreme Court, neither mentioned 
the circumstance of Xu Liang as a public figure nor discussed the extent of the 
limited protection for his reputation during the trial.199  In 2000, Zhao 
Zhongxiang sued XinHua Newspaper for defamation200  The plaintiff Zhao 
Zhongxiang had been a well-known anchor on China Central Television.201  Con-
trary to that of a private figure, his right to reputation should tolerate public com-
ments.  In the decision, the court hinted that as a public figure, Zhao 
Zhongxiang’s reputation should be more protected than commoners’ reputa-
tion.202  In a rights-regulated society, freedom of speech is a fundamental princi-
ple and the protection of reputation is only an exception to the principle.  There-
fore, to uphold the fundamental principle, the protection of reputation is limited in 
some situations, especially with regard to the reputation of public figures.203 
 
198 See Xu Liang Su Shanghai Wenhua Yishubao, Zhao Weichang Qinhai Mingyuquan Jiufen An (徐
良诉《上海文化艺术报》、赵伟昌侵害名誉权纠纷案) [Xu Liang v. Shanghai Culture & Art Newspa-
per Co. for Defamation Infringement & Zhao Weichang], 1990 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 4 (Sup. People’s 
Ct. 1989) (China). 
199 See id.  
200 See Zhao Zhongxiang Su Zhang Lin, Xinhua Ribaoshe Qinhai Mingyuquan Jiufen An (赵忠祥诉
张淋, 《新华日报社》侵害名誉权纠纷案) [Zhao Zhongxiang v. Zhang Lin & Xinhua Newspaper for 




201 See id. 
202 See id. 
203 For instance, in the United States, a typical private rights-regulated society, the fair comment de-
fense protects expressions of opinion about the public performances of persons such as entertainers and 
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In the past three years, however, some judicial decisions in China regarding 
defamation have begun to consider the tolerance of public figures and leave more 
space for public comments and critiques.  Some courts have used their discretion 
to limit the rights of public figures even without clear statutory authorizations.  
This trend can be considered progress towards greater freedom of speech and an-
other step towards a rights-regulated society.  For instance, in a 2011 case, Zheng 
sued JinLing and the Nanjing Daily Newspaper Group for harming Zheng’s repu-
tation.204  Zheng was a well-known national football player in China and was ac-
cused by the defendants for being involved in illegal soccer gambling.205  Zheng 
sued the defendants for defamation.206  The defendants were two media enterpris-
es that reported the public rumors of his gambling.207  Both at the trial and the 
appeal, the courts held that Zheng was a public figure and should tolerate the re-
ports of the newspapers for public concerns despite damage to his reputation.208  
His claim was rejected in both trials.209  In the same year, another case emerged 
regarding a defamation dispute between Cai Jiming and Baidu.210  Cai Jiming is a 
well-known professor and expert of social science in China.  His proposal of a 
public holiday arrangement reform provoked a lot of debate among the public.211  
Some internet users opened a public bulletin board section (“BBS”) section on 
Baidu.com under his name.212  Users frequently wrote sarcastic, humiliating, and 
vulgar comments against Cai Jiming.213  Cai Jiming sued Baidu for secondary 
liability of defamation and asked them to shut down the BBS under his name.  
Both in the first trial and in the appeal, the courts refused to uphold his request to 
shut down the BBS section titled with his name.214  The courts reasoned that BBS 
was a channel for the public to address their opinions and comments on public 
affairs.215  For purpose of public supervision and freedom of speech, the public 
 
politicians who voluntarily place themselves before the public.  As this defense was expanded by the 
courts, it came to protect even hostile expressions of opinion so long as two qualifications were met: the 
expression had to be based on facts that were correct and accurate, and the expression had to be a critique 
of the person’s public performance rather than her private life.  See GENELLE BELMAS & WAYNE OVER-
BECK, MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW 145 (3d ed. 2015).  In recent years, many states have eliminated 
these requirements, extending libel protection to all expressions of opinion that are clearly labeled as such, 
while allowing libel suits only for items that could be taken to be false statements of fact.  See id. 
204 Zheng MouYu Nanjing Wanbaoshe He Nanjing Baoye Jituan An (郑某与金陵晚报社、南京日报
报业集团案（(2010 )静民一(民)初字第2807号）) [Zheng Mou v. Jinling Evening Newspaper, Nanjing 






209 Id.  
210 Cai Jiming Yu Baidu.com Qinhai Mingyuquan Xiaoxiangquan Xingmingquan Yinsiquan Jiufen 
An (蔡继明与百度公司侵害名誉权、肖像权、姓名权、隐私权纠纷案) [Cai Jiming v. Baidu.com], 
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should be allowed to express their voice by various channels unless they willfully 
attack and insults Cai Jiming himself.216  In these two 2011 cases, the protection 
of reputation for public figures was overpowered by freedom of expression.  
Additionally, the core interest of the regime of power is to maintain authority, 
reputation, and protection.  Protecting the authority’s power naturally restricts the 
freedom of expression.  Similar to protecting private rights in a rights-regulated 
society, protecting power in a power-regulated society is essential.  Both societies 
value the core interest that makes them strong—their interests happen to be on the 
opposite sides of the spectrum.  This is why freedom of expression could destabi-
lize the authority and can harm the power-regulated society’s core interests.  
In a rights-regulated society the government officials and the president can be 
criticized.  The public can even vocalize their intentions to campaign against the 
president and even call for his resignation.  For example, in the United States, the 
standard test used to gauge if a person has abused their freedom of speech is 
whether that speech causes “a clear and present danger.”217  This standard was 
created in Schenck v. United States: 
 
[T]he most stringent protection of free speech would not protect 
a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic . . . 
[t]he question in every case is whether the words used are used 
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substan-
tive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.218 
 
Justice Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Whitney v. California further ex-
plained the test for a clear and present danger:  
 
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free 
speech and assembly.  Men feared witches and burnt women.  It 
is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irra-
tional fears.  To justify suppression of free speech, there must be 
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free 
speech is practiced.  There must be reasonable ground to believe 
that the danger apprehended is imminent.  There must be rea-
sonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a seri-
ous one.  Every denunciation of existing law tends in some 
measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of 
it. . . In order to support a finding of clear and present danger, it 
must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be 
 
216 Id. 
217 Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
218 Id. 
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expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished 
reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.219 
 
Many media enterprises and citizens outside the United States admire the 
freedom of speech enjoyed by the American people and its media industry.  But it 
is necessary to emphasize once more that freedom in the United States comes 
from its unique political structure, history, and geopolitics.  Without the same 
conditions as America, China’s freedom of expression could be in real danger—
and even become a disaster.  Because the resource of social order originates from 
different roots in different societies, the level of tolerance for clear and present 
danger will be totally different. 
In a rights-regulated society, protecting private rights is the fundamental pur-
pose of the institution, whereas, in a power-regulated society, protecting the re-
gime of power is the fundamental purpose of the institution.220  Currently, China 
cannot easily regulate content shown on new network media because the country 
is no longer a typical power-regulated society.  Rather, it is a country undergoing 
an institutional transformation from a power-regulated society to a rights-
regulated society; it has begun competing and working with other rights-regulated 
societies, such as the United States and European countries.  Despite its transfor-
mation, China’s strict regulation of media content reflects its primary interest in 
power.  Currently, China still has more characteristics of a power-regulated socie-
ty than a rights-regulated society. 
The legal sources of content regulation to protect a regime of power are gen-
erally informal, temporary, and continuously readjusting.  In 2000, the Regulation 
on Internet Information Services of the People’s Republic of China (RIIS) was 
the administrative regulation that provided the legal basis for censoring content—
distinct from the private rights such as copyright and reputation.221  So far, RIIS is 
the most binding source of authority for content regulation.  But its legal status is 
low according to the Law on Legislation of China because the People’s Congress 
delegates the power to publish it to the State Council for temporary and experi-
mental purposes.222  Contextually, the RIIS is abstract, ambiguous, and discre-
tionary. 
 
219 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
220 For instance, in the Islamic world, Prophet Muhammad is the symbol of authority for the religious 
order.  Therefore, when Danish cartoonists drew caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad and published them 
in European journals, justifying their publication under the principle of freedom of expression, it outraged 
people in the Arab world.  See Charlene Gubash, Why Muslims are Mad over Prophet Cartoons, NBC 
NEWS, Sept. 11, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11164199/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/why-
muslims-are-mad-over-prophet-cartoons/ (“[T]he Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen is reach-
ing out to diplomats and leaders in the Arab world to try to explain the situation, but reiterating that his 
government cannot interfere with issues concerning the press.  Everybody in the Muslim world, though, 
wants a clear-cut apology.  They don’t want the caveat of free speech, they want a clear-cut apology.  So, 
maybe it won’t go away until they hear those words, ‘I’m sorry.’”). 
221 Regulation on Internet Information Services of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 
the St. Council, Sept. 20, 2000, effective on Jan. 8, 2011) (Lawinfochina). 
222 See Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China (Order of President No. 31) (promulgated 
by the Nat’l People’s Cong., March 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000).  Article 9 of the Order states: 
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In 2012, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress promul-
gated the decision on Strengthening Information Protection on Networks 
(SIPN).223  This decision is only composed of twelve articles, and among them, 
Articles V and VI are controversial and contested.224  Article V requires that net-
work service providers actively monitor the content of the network and delete 
illegal content promptly.225  Article VI requires the network service providers to 
record the identity of people using their networks.226  These Articles seriously 
threaten the network users’ freedom of expression.  In rights-regulated societies 
like the United States and European Union, such a regulation would have been 
debated extensively and even sent back through the legislature multiple times 
before being approved.  But in China, the legislation was prompt, confidential, 
and unpredictable.227  The content, legislative process, and technological exper-
tise used in the SIPN regulation was totally different from the laws regulating 
private rights, such as copyright law and tort law.  The function of such regula-
tions is an authorization of government involvement rather than a limit on gov-
ernmental power. 
 
If laws have not been enacted on the affairs specified in Article 8 of this Law, the National People's 
Congress or its Standing Committee has the power to make a decision to authorize the State Council to 
formulate, according to actual needs, administrative regulations first on part of those affairs, except for the 
affairs concerning criminal offences and their punishment, mandatory measures and penalties involving 
deprivation of citizens of their political rights or restriction of the freedom of their person, and the judicial 
system. 
Id at art. 9.  Article 11 of the same Order states: 
After the administrative regulations on an affair formulated under authorization have been tested in 
practice and when the conditions are ripe for making a law on the affair, the National People's Congress or 
its Standing Committee shall make a law on it in a timely manner.  As soon as the law is made, the authori-
zation with regard to that matter shall be terminated accordingly. 
Id. at art. 11. 
223 National People's Congress Standing Committee Decision concerning Strengthening Network In-
formation Protection (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 28, 2012, effective 
Dec. 28, 2012). 
224 Laney Zhang, China: NPC Decision on Network Protection, THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
(Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-npc-decision-on-network-information-
protection/. 
225 Article V states: 
Network service providers shall strengthen management of information disseminated by users, where 
it occurs that information violated by laws or regulations is published or disseminated, handling measures 
such as ceasing the dissemination of the said information, deleting it, etc., relevant records are to be pre-
served, and the relevant controlling departments informed. 
Id. at art. V. 
226 Article VI states: 
Network service providers that handle website access service for users, handle fixed telephone, mo-
bile telephone and other surfing formalities, or provide the information publication services to users, shall, 
when concluding agreements with users or affirming the provision of service, require users to provide real 
identity information. 
Id. at art. VI. 
227 Typically, law proposals in China must be published by the State Council Legal Office for public 
comments before voting in the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee.  Laws related to 
state secrets, security, or finance, however, are the exceptions to this requirement.  Under this exception, 
SIPN has bypassed the Standing Committee and the usual law proposal requirements.  The list of proposals 
published by the State Council Legal Office for public comments can be viewed at GUÓWÙYUÀN FǍZHÌ 
BÀNGŌNGSHÌ (国务院法制办公室) [LEGIS. AFF. OFF. OF THE ST. COUNCIL P.R. CHINA], 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/cazjgg/index.shtml?44 (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
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Lastly, the regulations on content for the different types of information used 
by new network media enterprises, like Baidu and Sina, are very different.  There 
are two groups of internet content that concerns the Chinese government.  The 
first is content that offends privacy rights, such as intellectual property, privacy, 
and reputation.  The second is content that offends the regime of power or public 
morality, such as the confidential information regarding national leaders, national 
security, public order, and pornography.  Taking Baidu for instance, the company 
has two teams to supervise the content of its website.228  The copyright protection 
team deals with the private rights content while the second team, called the 
“Huang or Fan” team—meaning “pornographic or antigovernment”—deals with 
the regime of power or public morality content.229  The teams—made up of one 
hundred members and two hundred, respectively—adopt different standards of 
review.230  The first team has review standards that are comparatively neutral and 
passive.231  They follow so called “safe harbor” provisions and “notice and take 
down” procedures.232  The second team, in charge of protecting the regime of 
power and public morality, has a higher standard of review.233  The second group 
works around the clock, removing any offensive material, without notifying third 
parties.234 
The criteria that the second team uses to categorize offensive material is an 
interesting and evolving set of parameters that changes with time and the re-
gime’s whims.  Private personal information about the members of the Standing 
Committee of the Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party is restricted 
and hidden unless it is voluntarily disclosed by the regime.  This contrasts with 
the practice in rights-regulated societies, like the United States, where any news 
outlet can report on the personal lives of politicians.235  Even though in recent 
 
228 See Evan Woo, Baidu’s Censored Answers to Wikipedia, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2007), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2007-11-13/baidus-censored-answer-to-wikipediabusinessweek-
business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (describing the internal censorship structure of Baidu 
compared to Sina). 
229 WeChat interview with Tan Jun, legal counsel, Baidu (Feb 16, 2017). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Xinxi Wangluo Chuanbo Quan Baohu Tiaoli (信息网络传播权保护条例) [Regulation on the Pro-
tection of the Right to Network Dissemination of Information] (promulgated by St. Council, May 18, 2006, 
effective July 1, 2006), CN064 (WIPO), English translation available at http://www.wipo.int 
/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=182147. 
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Post Deletions, USINEX Security Symposium (2013), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/235766144 
(last visited Feb. 15 2017) (describing research regarding censorship.)  The report stated: 
Our research found that deletions happen most heavily in the first hour after a post has been made.  
Especially for original posts that are not reposts, most deletions occur within 5–30 minutes, accounting for 
30% of the total deletions of such posts.  Nearly 90% of the deletions of such posts happen within the first 
24 hours of the post. 
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years China’s government has become more tolerant to criticism from the media 
and public, the collective actions or expressions that are extorted by interest 
groups for bargaining leverage that can threaten the stability of the society and 






Since the reform and open policy of 1979, China has been building the foun-
dation for a rights-regulated society using the market and private rights.  Personal 
private rights, like the right to property, reputation, and dignity, have gained 
recognition and stronger protection.  They now play a major role in China’s de-
veloping media regulations.  It is apparent that on the spectrum of media regula-
tion, China has been moving from a power-regulated society to a rights-regulated 
society. 
Some private rights in China have improved drastically over the past three 
decades and are close to Western standards.  Private rights, like copyrights, that 
are not relevant to the security or interest of the regime have benefited.  Despite 
the lagging statutory support, China’s judicial system has also progressed towards 
a rights-regulated society by choosing to protect freedom of speech over the 
rights of public figures’ reputation and privacy.  This issue has not yet been final-
ized and remains on the front lines of battle through the institutional transfor-
mation.  Information related to the core interests of the regime—like national se-
curity and confidential information on key leaders of the regime of power—
however, remains censored and strictly regulated—regardless of any free speech 
rights.  This illustrates China’s political structure as a power-regulated society.  
The disclosure of highly controversial information related to the regime can ruin 
the legitimacy, authority, and ability of the regime to regulate the society and 
could damage the fundamental function and purpose of the government to provide 
a national defense and social order.  But with the progress of institutional trans-
formation thus far, the regime of power in China has become more tolerant of free 
speech.  Since institutional transformation is a long process, we cannot expect a 
democratic version of freedom of speech and press to be fully integrated into 
Chinese society just yet.  
 
236 See King et al., supra note 169, at 342.  As Gary King explained: 
The evidence suggests that when the leadership allowed social media to flourish in the country, they 
also allowed the full range of expression of negative and positive comments about the state, its policies, and 
its leaders.  As a result, government policies sometimes look as bad, and leaders can be as embarrassed, as 
is often the case with elected politicians in democratic countries, but, as they seem to recognize, looking 
bad does not threaten their hold on power so long as they manage to eliminate discussions associated with 
events that have collective action potential—where a locus of power and control, other than the govern-
ment, influences the behaviors of masses of Chinese people.  With respect to this type of speech, the Chi-
nese people are individually free but collectively in chains. 
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The formation of a society’s political structure is driven by the history of its 
intense competition.  The essential structure of an institution is to foster a healthy 
balance between competition and collaboration.  Competing pressures, communi-
cation technology, geopolitics, and the availability of new energy are key varia-
bles that shape the formation of a specific institution and drive its progress.  An-
cient China’s political structure was the most successful in the world, and, once 
again, it is transforming into a new world superpower.  Media plays a critical 
function in that process because it shapes the new social consciousness and con-
tracts.  The Chinese media policy and regulation are halfway through a positive 
transformation.  Therefore, it is baseless and potentially disastrous to attempt to 
copy a mature rights-regulate society’s media policy, like the United States’ First 
Amendment to the Constitution, onto China’s unique political structure.  China 
needs gradual change based on its own unique features, culture, and history in 
order to progress through its institutional transformation. 
 
